Re:CAA checking becomes mandatory for SSL/TLS certificates
by pfg on Monday April 10, 2017 @07:55AM
(#14077718)
That's correct. Browsers offer other mechanisms like HPKP to mitigate attacks through rogue CAs.
Active CAA checks by browsers would either be soft-fail like OCSP (i.e. useless in the face of an active adversary who could block the request or spoof the response) or cause a lot of unnecessary warnings because of failed requests. You'd also have to force every site on earth to create a CAA record if you want it to be hard-fail. That's going to be impossible.
Re:CAA checking becomes mandatory for SSL/TLS certificates
by tialaramex on Wednesday April 12, 2017 @10:21AM
(#14097938)
Not really, no. CAA addresses the problem where you'd like to actively tell a trustworthy CA not to issue for your names.
The Facebook incident I've mentioned further up is a good example.
Surely the problem this sort of thing is meant to address is rogue CAs who are already behaving badly.