It's "The Mind's I: Fantasies and Reflections on Self and Soul" by Douglas R. Hofstadter and Daniel C. Dennett
"The Mind's Eye" is by Oliver Sacks (who has almost definitely read Hofstadter/Dennett)
Bravo. Might I add that Tononi's IIT theory is just a technical detail of implementation, insufficient by itself. Consciousness is in fact the reinforcement learning system connected to the world by the perception system. The state + value of the RL agent represents consciousness.
And perhaps more controversially, I'm always a bit taken aback by the constant blase assertion that consciousness is a mystery. Is it really surprising that we have a first person subjective experience? We know that we are incredibly complex things, constantly integrating and acting on very complicated external stimuli. Such a system should have references to its own body and its own neural states, its train of reasoning should frequently include itself, its focus will drift forward and backwards in time... this is just how a system like this would work. If the system communicates about its state then its language should have referents to these internal states, referents like "experience", and "feels like", and "I understand". Is that surprising? Wouldn't it be surprising if it wasn't like that?
I think that Tononi's approach is a good approximation, but it can't be a full solution because the word 'consciousness' is too anthropocentric. One criticism of IIT showed that a seemingly uninteresting complex artificial system could have a very high IIT complexity quotient. The problem is that the things we use to define the term 'consciousness' are things that can be approximated to varying degrees by chimps or dolphins or generative adversarial networks or antfarms or thermometers. But behind our use of the word 'consciousness' there is still almost always a very slightly disguised dualism that uses it as a substitute for the word 'soul'.
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