Totally agree about the "security questions". They're just insecurity questions. Everyone knows what street I used to live on and what my previous phone numbers were.
"What is your mother's maiden name?" - "gHk899iL@"
So-called "security questions" are the dumbest security measure.
My solution is just to keep those answers in the "extra notes" section of my password manager.
Oh, and they referred to these security questions as "2FA."
https://www.united.com/ual/en/us/account/enroll/default
Derp.
I love the ones that ask about one's favourite sports team (not everyone likes sports), or first girl (or boy) friend (not everyone has dated) or first car (not everyone has ever owned a car).
It weakens it to the extent of your physical security. But in practice how many crackers are breaking in to your flat [aka condo] to find your written down security responses, unless you're famous - or a target some other way (politician?) - in which case you should have sufficient physical security to protect the written answers.
Having security questions allows users to use hard passwords without the problem of losing an account. It increases the risk of personal attacks, for sure, but I'd warrant the chance of personal attack [ie by someone who knows you (or has gone through your bins)] is minimal for most people vs. the chance of an automated online attack.
I think it's right to minimise the online attack surface at the risk of the offline one for most users.
Regretfully Apple has an annoying bug that the dialogboxes accepts 5-word phrases, but only remember the first 32characters, 3 words or something alike. Very stressfull when you’re trying to recover a password.
If you are willing to be brave about this then the best way of answering security questions is by typing a random string and NOT writing it down. You will never need that value again.
Today, years later, I still can't login to the damn payroll site because there isn't a procedure for just completely resetting the password state of the account and it wouldn't let you log in without those extra things.
Since that point I have recorded every annoying split-password (that's what the 'security questions' actually are, a forced split in the single real password)...
Also, the big question that's missing from the article is: who's the enemy? If the enemy are Russian genius hackers, then certainly very long passwords and maybe other measures are in order.
But the enemy is not always remote. I just bought a new iPad and had to reset my password and so-called "security questions".
In my experience, there are only two kinds of security questions: ones I don't know the answer to myself, and ones everyone around me knows the answer to (what was your first job, what was your surname when you were a child, etc.)
The problem is, in the case of the iPad, your enemy is not some James Bond villain in a cave in Ukraine, it's your 13 year old child who wants to use your account to buy apps, or your spouse during a nasty separation. And they both know, or can guess, answers to "security questions".
What I do personally is type random things as the answers, and write them down somewhere. But that doesn't improve security, it weakens it.