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Re:SJCL – Stanford JavaScript Crypto Library by baby on Wednesday March 08, 2017 @11:18AM (#13821242)
> For one, the client is downloading the crypto JS implementation (almost) every time they are using the app

Not in the case of browsers' extensions or Electron/NW.js apps.

> XSS vuln on your website? crypto.js is useless since attacker will just exfiltrate your private key / password through XSS.

It's not like buffer overread and other vulns don't exist in the non-browser world. Also, a huge amount of XSS vulns can be avoided by having a good CSP config.

Now I'm not supporting javascript crypto. Just responding to some of your points. Inb4 some crypto SJW quotes me on that.

Re:SJCL – Stanford JavaScript Crypto Library by tptacek on Wednesday March 08, 2017 @11:47AM (#13821433)
I think it's important to decouple Javascript the language, Javascript the runtime, and the browser security model from each other. Javascript --- the language and the runtime --- aren't ideal environments in which to do crypto, but they're not untenable. It's the browser --- not the browser shell, running as a standalone application as in Electron, but the actual Chrome browser that fetches things from URLs --- that makes crypto untenable.
Re:SJCL – Stanford JavaScript Crypto Library by newscasta on Friday March 10, 2017 @11:49AM (#13839916)
Tangentially related (and this conversation might have moved on already) but I'd be curious to hear your view on 1password's sync service. I know you like and use 1password standalone. Do you have a recommendation for how to sync across devices? Thanks!
Re:SJCL – Stanford JavaScript Crypto Library by homakov on Thursday March 09, 2017 @01:05AM (#13827355)
That is well put, probably worth slightly revising your old article to highlight that.