The only reason this isn't a big deal is that it remains incredibly easy for attackers to get CC#'s without capturing packets off the wire.
(OK, I sympathize: buying a thousand bucks of stuff in four transactions from central Japan at 2 in the morning is not exactly typical behavior for a Bank of America customer.)
I have pre-paid phone, buy small items from Google checkout, and travel frequently. Barclay's knows this, but still keeps calling to confirm my (quite regular, very normal) transactions and blocking my cards.
That had me laughing, you really clearly have not dealt with large numbers of $10 to $50 transactions.
Card companies don't care at all about such charges, if you have a valid card number, expiry in the future and a cvv that matches the charge will be accepted.
VBV and its sister programs has been designed to combat this and passes most of the responsibility back to the consumer or their bank in five-way handshake between the consumer, the merchant, the IPSP, the bank and the issuer.
I seriously doubt that Schneier would consider this information disclosure OK based on this loose interpretation of his blog post.
From Bruce Scheier's blog[1]:
"But once you understand that the problem is fraudulent transactions, you quickly realize that authenticating the transaction, not the person, is the way to proceed.
"Again, think about credit cards. Store clerks barely verify signatures when people use cards. People can use credit cards to buy things by mail, phone or Internet, where no one verifies the signature or even that you have possession of the card.
"Even worse, no credit card company mandates secure storage requirements for credit cards. They don't demand that cardholders secure their wallets in any particular way. Credit card companies simply don't worry about verifying the cardholder or putting requirements on what he does. They concentrate on verifying the transaction."
[1]:http://www.schneier.com/essay-153.html