News for hackers. Stuff that matters.
Re:Summary of the Amazon S3 Service Disruption by pinko on Thursday March 02, 2017 @12:43PM (#13776233)
I always wonder about unintended consequences of this sort of thing. Like someday there will be a worm about to rampage through their servers and someone says, "take them all offline now!" and the answer is, "we can't because of the throttle safeguard we put in place after incident XYZ, it will be about 17 hours..."
Re:Summary of the Amazon S3 Service Disruption by savanaly on Thursday March 02, 2017 @12:57PM (#13776406)
By safeguard I meant (and I think Amazon means too) an extra step that is required by the user before they can do the action so they don't do it by accident. Not something that prevents it entirely. Like how an MMO requires you before you delete a character to type the character's name in a box that pops up before you can delete it. That's far outside the realm of usual user interface, but that's so if you are just trying to edit a character it's impossible to accidentally hit that delete key. An analogous system for Amazon that would have prevented this outage: delete 10 nodes, ok. Delete 100 nodes, box pops up saying 'To delete this many nodes you must type the following in to a message box: "I want to take down a dangerously large amount of nodes."'
Re:Summary of the Amazon S3 Service Disruption by hinkley on Thursday March 02, 2017 @01:31PM (#13776783)
It occurs to me that having to type the English version of the numbers would probably work in this scenario.

   s3-shutdown -c "one hundred fifty"
But something simpler like a --emergency flag or the more whimsical --shutitdownshutitalldown
Re:Summary of the Amazon S3 Service Disruption by traek on Thursday March 02, 2017 @04:58PM (#13778643)
Facebook uses a `--clowntown` flag to let people do things without normal checks. [0]

[0] https://www.quora.com/When-people-who-work-at-Facebook-say-c...

Re:Summary of the Amazon S3 Service Disruption by hamms on Friday March 03, 2017 @08:10PM (#13788483)
I also rather like their intentionally verbose and scary parameter for generating arbitrary HTML in React: https://facebook.github.io/react/docs/dom-elements.html#dang...
Re:Summary of the Amazon S3 Service Disruption by rickcnagy on Thursday March 02, 2017 @03:41PM (#13777987)
I think the biggest problem with flags like --emergency is if they end up in daily use, such as git --force. Then, they are both sudo-level AND used without a lot of though.
Re:Summary of the Amazon S3 Service Disruption by hinkley on Thursday March 02, 2017 @04:35PM (#13778461)
I was in fact thinking of the --force problem which is why I went another way.
Re:Summary of the Amazon S3 Service Disruption by geeio on Thursday March 02, 2017 @04:02PM (#13778168)
Maybe more like --force-with-lease
Re:Summary of the Amazon S3 Service Disruption by 1_2__3 on Thursday March 02, 2017 @01:07PM (#13776520)
I'm remembering tools I've worked with where the cheeky dev required things like type the sentence "I know what I am doing and wish to proceed." in order to perform unsafe operations.

I've always wondered why ops hasn't adopted some of the best practices that have been around for years to avoid fat finger errrors. Like why don't we have systems where to do something dangerous requires two separate people run the command, or there's an approval step, or whatever.

Re:Summary of the Amazon S3 Service Disruption by fixermark on Thursday March 02, 2017 @01:22PM (#13776668)
The most common explanation: "cute" interactions make it harder to script the command-line tools because you have to account for the extra layer of indirection or write a bit of screen-scrape logic to get the command prompt input.

I've always found that explanation a little threadbare.

Re:Summary of the Amazon S3 Service Disruption by TeMPOraL on Thursday March 02, 2017 @02:30PM (#13777375)
I think the hoops you have to jump through should scale with severity. Then if you find yourself writing scripts that screen-scrape interactive output to get around some safeguards, you're doing something very wrong.
Re:Summary of the Amazon S3 Service Disruption by runevault on Thursday March 02, 2017 @12:56PM (#13776380)
Which is why there needs to be an override switch, but it needs to be very very explicit that you are going past the safeguards. And only a limited number of people who can use that override.
Re:Summary of the Amazon S3 Service Disruption by josephorjoe on Thursday March 02, 2017 @12:45PM (#13776262)
then you need to "sudo take them all offline now!"
Re:Summary of the Amazon S3 Service Disruption by deegles on Thursday March 02, 2017 @12:47PM (#13776285)
"We can't because we put a safeguard in for that last week!"
Re:Summary of the Amazon S3 Service Disruption by phonon on Thursday March 02, 2017 @12:59PM (#13776427)
"Just pull the power!"
Re:Summary of the Amazon S3 Service Disruption by jrgifford on Thursday March 02, 2017 @01:34PM (#13776810)
"We've got redundant power - you can't!"
Re:Summary of the Amazon S3 Service Disruption by TeMPOraL on Thursday March 02, 2017 @02:28PM (#13777352)
"So take the emergency chainsaw, and go cut the Internet cables."
Re:Summary of the Amazon S3 Service Disruption by hinkley on Thursday March 02, 2017 @06:24PM (#13779317)
We have physically redundant cables and microwave backup.
Re:Summary of the Amazon S3 Service Disruption by mrep on Thursday March 02, 2017 @10:37PM (#13780575)
There are people who can still do fleet wide root access commands and I don't think that type of thing will ever be removed (just very restricted) for this exact type of situation.
Re:Summary of the Amazon S3 Service Disruption by accountface on Thursday March 02, 2017 @01:29PM (#13776753)
Instead of rate limiting you'd be better off making it a two-key operation once you hit X threshold. Jr admin can delete 10, but the boss needs to confirm a deletion of 100.
Re:Summary of the Amazon S3 Service Disruption by perlgeek on Thursday March 02, 2017 @03:23PM (#13777825)
You can always build the safeguard to require approval from a peer (or superior) to an action that is normally considered dangerous, at least for overriding the throttle.
Re:Summary of the Amazon S3 Service Disruption by romaniv on Thursday March 02, 2017 @05:10PM (#13778737)
Anything that requires human approval for routine operations quickly devolves into bureaucracy that adds a lot of manual steps without any real safety. Now, you may argue definition of "routine operation", but the thing in the article didn't sound like they were doing anything crazy.