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Re:Summary of the Amazon S3 Service Disruption by edutechnion on Thursday March 02, 2017 @12:31PM (#13776101)
For the many of us who have built businesses dependent on S3, is anyone else surprised at a few assumptions embedded here?

* "authorized S3 team member" -- how did this team member acquire these elevated privs?

* Running playbooks is done by one member without a second set of eyes or approval?

* "we have not completely restarted the index subsystem or the placement subsystem in our larger regions for many years"

The good news:

* "The S3 team had planned further partitioning of the index subsystem later this year. We are reprioritizing that work to begin immediately."

The truly embarrassing that everyone has known about for years is the status page:

* "we were unable to update the individual services’ status on the AWS Service Health Dashboard "

When there is a wildly-popular Chrome plugin to fix your page ("Real AWS Status") you would think a company as responsive as AWS would have fixed this years ago.

Re:Summary of the Amazon S3 Service Disruption by icelancer on Thursday March 02, 2017 @12:34PM (#13776122)
>Unauthorized S3 team member

This is not in the post.

Re:Summary of the Amazon S3 Service Disruption by dmoy on Thursday March 02, 2017 @12:34PM (#13776127)
) An authorized, not unauthorized. They sound almost identical, English language is... Yea :/

) If it's a playbook for something with minimal intended impact sure. The issue is that the tooling had larger capabilities than should be.

) Yes that seems like a major, major problem.

Re:Summary of the Amazon S3 Service Disruption by dmd on Thursday March 02, 2017 @12:34PM (#13776131)
It says authorized, not unauthorized.
Re:Summary of the Amazon S3 Service Disruption by jhull on Thursday March 02, 2017 @12:36PM (#13776164)
the post mortem says an authorized team member