Executables in git are bad practise, but not all that uncommon. Images in git are the norm, and if somebody comes in and creates a pull request with an improved version of the existing images (better compression, better adapted for color blind people, fixing whitespace issues etc.) that's pretty unsuspicious and likely to succeed (and I've seen it multiple times).
But how would a safer hash improve resistance to that blob update scenario? How would a weaker hash make it more dangerous? If you have a fiercely audited branch next to one that is basically free for all, maybe?
Let me put it more simply: if you're accepting patches for binary files in your repos you don't care about security at all. Maybe unless if you know how to decode machine code/JPEG manually.
Also, the proposition was to use the full hash internally, and truncate the representation. Nobody other than git itself uses full hashes anyways.