Re:Announcing the first SHA-1 collision
by agrajag on Thursday February 23, 2017 @04:16PM
(#13717853)
Those extra precautions are designed explicitly to prevent the ability to get a certificate using a collision attack. CA's now must explicitly introduce entropy into a certificate to prevent exactly this, and will not sign a certificate exactly to the specifications of a client.
There's a great deal of handwaving there saying that a collision attack alone is sufficient for breaking SSL.
Re:Announcing the first SHA-1 collision
by mike_hearn on Thursday February 23, 2017 @12:38PM
(#13715819)
Moreover, how quickly we forget! An intelligence agency did in fact carry out such an attack on code signing certificates using an MD5 collision as part of the FLAME malware.
Of course, the real certificate issuance process is more complicated and has some extra precautions to protect from it, my point is that you don't need preimage, collisions should suffice for breaking SSL.