It would be easier to simply move almost everything not needed by the kernel into 'userspace' and have some sort of capability system to enforce access rights.
And by that I meant that we would need no hardware support for separate address spaces. The kernel and all processes would share a single address space. We could look at memory as just another resource, and readable or writeable chunks of memory ("buffers") would be only accessible through authorized "memory arbitrator" entities. Of course some mechanism is required to prevent programs from making up buffers on their own; this can be done in hardware of course, but alternatively also by software mechanism, e.g. enforcing a higher-level programming language like Lisp.
So one could even say that each such buffer was their own address space; however I'm convinced the approach is much simpler and less arbitrary (no coupling process<->address space).
"Virtual address spaces" are a required abstraction, just as filesystems need to provide the illusion of contiguous available storage for files. This could of course be done in software, just as filesystems do it in software. However it would be a lot slower since we don't batch memory accesses like we batch file accesses.
The buffers are just chunks of the global address space that this process has been allowed to access. Processes already deal with a similar abstraction, what does mmap return but a buffer of memory? The only difference from the point of view of writing software is that pointers in shared memory start to work better.
I even think the source code to Singularity has been released under an open source-ish license, if you want to look into it.
If you search for my name there, you will find at least discussions about file modes and also why I claim that processes are a failed abstraction (it was really another user who pointed that out).
There was a thread here on HN a few days ago, and it showed some clear deficits of conventional OS, for example in processes. Speaking of lack of composability of clients and linked-in libraries, speaking of IPC and uncontrolled implicit environment inheritance (Docker... :<), speaking of the ad-hoc security model (Unix permissions, setuid hacks, and more recently extended attributes).
There's just a single trust boundary in Unix. What if the system was instead just a graph of interacting entities, each managing control over some resource? The "userland process" would just be another entity that is in control of another (more ephemeral) resource. We wouldn't even separate address spaces! Security by careful propagation through fine-grained trust boundaries (instead of globally accessible resource managers that have a hard time deciding whether a requesting entity should be authorized). Think svn vs git.
And my understanding is that that's much of what Lisp Machines were about...