In particular, what you are talking about is a Title III Wiretap (in transit) order with an additional element of technical assistance that requires significant re-architecture that would expose massive take, or enforced lying (endorse a false cert). This would put a huge burden on Riseup, and significantly undermine their operation. A Title III Wiretap order can only be done in very specific cases, it is much harder to obtain one of these than it is for a simple search warrant, or subponea. In fact its so difficult, that in 2015 Google received 15 wiretap orders in total and more thaan 8k search warrants. Not only that, but the government must show they can do data minimization and there is a notification requirement (unlike a search warrant) where they notify the target after 90 days. The tighter particularity requirements built into the statute make this a very good position for Riseup to be in.
> there is no case where the government has pressed the issue about modifying systems
Do we know that, or would it be more accurate to say 'there is no case that we know of'? And we do have some reason to believe that the U.S. government has pressured large telcos to modify equipment; look up Qwest's story.
How does that not translate into people who are concerned about investigations simply not using Riseup (at least, for email)?
It doesn't seem particularly likely that every member of a group of people will find out about the investigation before any damage is done and then also follow through abandoning their accounts with perfect discipline.
They won't get access to past mail until the user next logs in but would least get access to any future mail the account receives and you are not in control of any email being received.
People check their email often, so maybe this is why they are writing
> this type of encryption is not end-to-end message encryption. With Riseup’s new system, you still put faith in the server while you are logged in
The message should be "if you think you're under investigation, abandon your email and don't login anymore."
Another attack is with the received messages: I assume they are all cleartext and can be intercepted before they are encrypted at step 6, with or without the cooperation of Riseup. Messages in a conversation often integrally quote all the previous messages so there might even be no need to force Riseup decrypt anything at step 5.