An example is the CRIME attack. But that involves a chosen plaintext attack, so I'm not sure if something can be done with this method.
The research is published with information that is far too low-level. Very few software developers, including the vast majority of engineers with degrees, understand the theory and math behind these issues. The best of the worst of us know not to roll our own crypto, but that is clearly the tip of the iceberg. Someone out there needs to figure out how to properly explain "Crypto for Dummies" if we ever want or expect the overall security of encryption to improve.
I would say that "compress, then encrypt is bad" is the wrong message to take away from this type of vulnerability. In the case of CRIME in particular, the issue was that:
1. The attacker provided part of the message. 2. The rest of the message contained a secret. 3. The entire message (attacker-provided-part and secret) were compressed together.
We can stop there; the length of the compressed data now contains information about the similarity between the attacker-provided content and the secret.
The correct lesson to take away from this is "do not compress a combination of attacker-provided content and secrets". Compressing before encrypting is perfectly sensible. (And, by the way, compressing after encrypting isn't better, it is useless since your encrypted content ought to be incompressible.)
Perhaps it is just my own meager understanding of cryptography, but I didn't know of anything that would make this a bad idea. Can you explain why it is potentially a problem?