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Re:How to leak to the press by exhilaration on Friday January 27, 2017 @12:13PM (#13501023)
I'm confused, what would TLS do? The surveillance agencies can log an HTTPS URL as easily as an HTTP URL, they don't need to see the contents to see that you requested it.
Re:How to leak to the press by mcherm on Friday January 27, 2017 @12:18PM (#13501061)
Not true.

HTTPS encrypts the URL as well as the content of the communication. Someone surveilling the conversation with the ability to observe all network traffic but without the ability to decrypt SSL traffic would be able to tell that the end user had viewed something at a particular website (technically, at a particular server), but would NOT be able to tell WHICH article was viewed.

Re:How to leak to the press by detaro on Friday January 27, 2017 @12:20PM (#13501082)
I wonder how much that actually gains for this specific case ("which article did IP $x view?"). With more effort, it should be fairly easy to match the traffic pattern to the article, e.g. by matching the size of subsequent requests for the images. But more complicated than a simple filter that just grabs all URLs from HTTP.
Re:How to leak to the press by ethbro on Friday January 27, 2017 @12:59PM (#13501355)
> With more effort

That's the new key point for 2017 pro-privacy architectures.

Proof of work surveillance doesn't scale because requiring it leverages the disparity between the total level of Internet traffic and intelligence agency resources.

Kill the dragnets as step 1, then worry about step 2.

Re:How to leak to the press by deathhand on Friday January 27, 2017 @01:13PM (#13501441)
It would be helpful to have a website to display a random image of differing sizes for every page load. This would prevent fingerprinting https.
Re:How to leak to the press by pixl97 on Friday January 27, 2017 @01:19PM (#13501471)
Um, I don't believe that would help. You either inline the images as data, or better, get rid of all images and have random length non-printing text to hide the real data. This kills caching and performance though.
Re:How to leak to the press by btown on Friday January 27, 2017 @01:37PM (#13501575)
https://github.com/technion/mod_randpad (an Nginx module that injects padding as a comment into returned HTML documents) is likely the correct layer to add random padding; the performance hit would be negligible.
Re:How to leak to the press by fowlslegs on Friday January 27, 2017 @08:10PM (#13504169)
SD dev here. You might be interested to check out https://github.com/freedomofpress/fingerprint-securedrop (note: still in experimental stages). We're going to be using the framework/ ML pipeline to evaluate server-side defenses (e.g., https://petsymposium.org/2017/papers/issue2/paper54-2017-2-s...), and are also working w/ Tor dev Mike Perry who is working on a solution or set of solutions to the problems of website & circuit fingerprinting with regards to Tor at the protocol level.

Edit: What Mike is trying to implement is based on https://arxiv.org/pdf/1512.00524.pdf.

Re:How to leak to the press by epmaybe on Friday January 27, 2017 @01:57PM (#13501720)
Could you as the host send out random extra bytes that make it hard to match up?
Re:How to leak to the press by jsnell on Friday January 27, 2017 @01:13PM (#13501442)
> at a particular website (technically, at a particular server)

You got it right the first time around, the parenthetical correction is wrong. The SNI is transmitted in plain text during the TLS handshake.

Re:How to leak to the press by leni536 on Friday January 27, 2017 @12:32PM (#13501165)
> but would NOT be able to tell WHICH article was viewed.

What about inspecting traffic pattern? I suspect that each article has different size.

Re:How to leak to the press by mtgx on Friday January 27, 2017 @01:02PM (#13501375)
I noticed some sites use a subdomain for securedrop. Does that reveal that they're visiting the securedrop page, or not?
Re:How to leak to the press by detaro on Friday January 27, 2017 @03:03PM (#13502181)
Yes, both through DNS requests (although one maybe could somewhat mitigate that by having each visit to the main domain trigger requests to the subdomain, a) creating traffic and b) putting it in peoples' DNS caches) and HTTPS (All modern browsers include the domain via SNI).

It still might be a better choice, given that the main domain for many sites goes through CDNs and more complex systems in general, increasing the risk of compromise there (which also would expose network details about the submitter, and possibly even more)? A dedicated securedrop site hopefully has dedicated infrastructure and better security.

Re:How to leak to the press by jnbiche on Friday January 27, 2017 @01:19PM (#13501476)
> Does that reveal that they're visiting the securedrop page, or not?

Potentially, if they're using TLS/SSL with SNI.

Re:How to leak to the press by fennecfoxen on Friday January 27, 2017 @01:31PM (#13501534)
Just as true if they're using the real domain with a dedicated IP, right?
Re:How to leak to the press by jnbiche on Saturday January 28, 2017 @10:23AM (#13506658)
Nope, if they're not using SNI, you'd just see the IP address. Fire up Wireshark some time when you're browsing and watch what comes through.
Re:How to leak to the press by fennecfoxen on Saturday January 28, 2017 @09:06PM (#13511342)
> Nope, if they're not using SNI, you'd just see the IP address.

but that's my point... if you're not using SNI, there's only one SSL server on that IP address, and if reverse-DNS fails you, you can connect on port 443 and ask it for its certificate and it will give it to you...

Re:How to leak to the press by grey-area on Friday January 27, 2017 @03:00PM (#13502166)
Ok, so they'd only know that you visited a domain like this at a given time?

securedrop.ap.org

That still gives away a lot, many of these secure drop sites are on a subdomain.

Re:How to leak to the press by fosco on Friday January 27, 2017 @01:38PM (#13501591)
I have a palo alto networks firewall with URL filtering.I can observe destination URL's on https sites without performing SSL decryption. please see eff website showing certain information that can be observed by onlookers[0] when you are using Tor or HTTPS or both

https encrypts the contents... not things like source/destination often only a destination IP address is required to get URL categories for many Proxy/URL filtering technologies.

[0] https://www.eff.org/pages/tor-and-https

Re:How to leak to the press by enzanki_ars on Friday January 27, 2017 @01:43PM (#13501627)
If you go to https://example.com/some/directory?param=something, the firewall will only see a request to https://example.com. Everything else is encrypted. In this case, with SSL, a government agency not doing a MITM will only see https://www.niemanlab.org, and http://www.niemanlab.org/2017/01/how-easy-is-it-to-securely-... if they were doing a MITM.
Re:How to leak to the press by hueving on Friday January 27, 2017 @02:00PM (#13501744)
You are confusing URLs with Domains. The only plaintext part of an SSL connection is the SNI, which is the domain.
Re:How to leak to the press by hackcasual on Friday January 27, 2017 @12:15PM (#13501037)
They can log the domain you connected to, not the URL you visited
Re:How to leak to the press by jvdh on Friday January 27, 2017 @12:21PM (#13501087)
Although with most TLS implementations they will see the size of your transfers, thus still giving away which URL you visited....
Re:How to leak to the press by mi100hael on Friday January 27, 2017 @02:29PM (#13501940)
Idea: HTTP server module that appends a minimal amount of hidden random garbage data (as a comment or similar) to each response so no two responses have the same fingerprint.
Re:How to leak to the press by moonlighter on Friday January 27, 2017 @02:39PM (#13502005)
user btown answered that elsewhere here in this thread: "https://github.com/technion/mod_randpad (an Nginx module that injects padding as a comment into returned HTML documents) is likely the correct layer to add random padding; the performance hit would be negligible."
Re:How to leak to the press by tyrust on Friday January 27, 2017 @12:24PM (#13501103)
If this is the first (and only) time someone visited the domain around the time of a leak, it may be a little suspicious.
Re:How to leak to the press by UnoriginalGuy on Friday January 27, 2017 @12:39PM (#13501205)
Then use public WiFi.
Re:How to leak to the press by jakelazaroff on Friday January 27, 2017 @12:25PM (#13501111)
It's worse than just knowing the URL. HTTP pages can be altered without your knowledge by a malicious third party: http://security.stackexchange.com/a/72661

So a surveillance agency could e.g. replace the URLs for the various organizations' leaks landing pages and Tor addresses with phishing pages, and anyone who used them would upload documents directly to the agency.

Re:How to leak to the press by olivierlacan on Friday January 27, 2017 @12:16PM (#13501049)
No, HTTPS URLs are not logged in plain text as they are in HTTP. So it does make an important difference.

See: http://security.stackexchange.com/a/2916/50175

Re:How to leak to the press by jvdh on Friday January 27, 2017 @12:25PM (#13501109)
If you mean "logging" as in web server logs, then it completely depends on the configuration of the server and there is nothing the client can do about it..

If you mean "transferring over the network", then yes, HTTPS only shows the server you are connecting to, but not the specific URL.

Then again, that can be deduced from the transfer sizes that are still shown.

Re:How to leak to the press by Gnewt on Friday January 27, 2017 @12:15PM (#13501042)
If they can't see the contents, they also can't see the URL -- both are encrypted.