1. It isn't secure against quantum computing attacks. Granted neither are elliptical curve based cryptosystems, so this isn't the motivation for switching.
2. It requires complicated padding schemes to prevent certain classes of attacks. The padding schemes do succeed at solving this problem, but they add a layer of complexity, and are often done incorrectly by inexperienced crypto users.
3. It is speculated that there are additional attacks based on math that hasn't yet been discovered. There is some speculation that the NSA has/is/will break RSA using these types of attacks.
4. There are a huge number of potential side channel attacks based on weirdness with how RSA key's affect the computation performed during encryption/decryption. Like with #2, there are ways around it, but it can still cause problems.
That said, if you use reasonable sized keys (2048 bit or larger), use libraries implemented by professionals with the correct options enabled, and you are worried about garden variety attacks, not the NSA, you are probably fine with RSA. Some people are starting to think that they are a little to much to bear, particularly when elliptic curves solve a lot of the problems and have smaller key sizes and faster computation.
Side note: But for a few exceptions, any processor on the market today (including mobile/embedded) could easily establish an SSH session using RSA without it being a significant cost. RSA (and Elliptic curve cryptography) is only used at the beginning of the session to establish a symmetric session key.
Assuming properly authenticated data, then decrypting without checking padding is no problem. For RSA encryption, padding only protects the sender. By itself RSA encryted data cannot be trusted, you need separate integrity protection for that.
RSA is an asymmetric system that gives you: 1.) eternal signatures 2.) encryption. But today we often don't want that anymore (eg. in instant messaging), instead we want:
- Forward secrecy, necessitating ephemeral keys and DH: but RSA keys can't be feasibly generated for each message or connection. Compared to eg. 25519-based ECC, where generating a key pair is 1.) generate 32 random bytes 2.) curve multiplication, meaning that you can generate many thousand keys/second/core.
- Authenticity, not signatures, hence again DH + MACs, not RSA signatures.
Also, this line doesn't make any sense: "Authenticity, not signatures, hence again DH + MACs, not RSA signatures."
You need an signature to have authenticity. The only alternative to this is pre-exchanging symmetric keys which isn't viable in the context of SSH.
There are also other caveats. Eg. EC keys tend to be tiny, just like symmetric keys, so one can much more easily distribute them through eg. QR codes, or even read them out loud. RSA keys, not so much.
If ECC fits the application well then using eg. Curve25519-based crypto over RSA or other EC is pretty much a no-brainer: it's, by a large margin, the asymmetric crypto systems with the fewest caveats both in implementation and application, and it's also very fast for any operation.
More info: https://wiki.mozilla.org/Security/Guidelines/OpenSSH
> Modern crypto is starting to use ECDSA because smaller key size means faster computation, but you wouldn't notice the difference in SSH anyway.
If you're using SSH for tiny bits of text (eg: bash) you won't.
If you're using SSH to move gigabytes of binary data (eg: rsync) you might.
No.
RSA or other asymmetric crypto is only used during connection establishment for authentication. Then symmetric key is established using DH and you use symmetric encryption to encrypt the data.
I remember changing around my ssh config a while back and seeing lower speeds when rsync'ing from an older laptop. But that makes sense, I recall cranking up my DH group to 16, 4096-bit, and that was probably why it was struggling.
What you do notice is using ciphers that are apt for the machine. If both ends are modern x86, for example, then you'd want to use [email protected] or [email protected] for best performance. Otherwise stick to [email protected], which is the default of recent versions.
Why is RSA on the way out? This is news for me. Are there any (potential) weaknesses that have been discovered recently in the RSA? I know that elliptic curve cryptography has shorter (and hence somewhat more convenient) keys, but that fact alone hardly makes RSA obsolete. Are there anything else?