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Re:Lavabit Reloaded by quanticle on Friday January 20, 2017 @07:56PM (#13448174)
The search doesn't happen on the server. The client (e.g. desktop client) indexes the messages and encrypts the index. Then, when another client (e.g. mobile client) wants to search for a message, it downloads the index, searches it, and then pulls down the appropriate message(s).
Re:Lavabit Reloaded by ynik on Saturday January 21, 2017 @07:32AM (#13449793)
If an attacker can tell which part of the index was modified, that gives them enough information to decrypt the index and e-mails.

Clients would always have to download+upload the full index (which needs to be re-encrypted with a new IV). This is a huge problem - the index can easily be hundreds of MB for a large mailbox.

Re:Lavabit Reloaded by e12e on Saturday January 21, 2017 @07:47AM (#13449829)
Technically if a client has a full index version X (in plaintext), it could modify X to get X+1, compute a binary diff between X and (X+1) - encrypt and upload the diff.

Another client on index version X could download the diff, and get index (X+1).

Some desktop client should probably do compaction from time to time.

Re:Lavabit Reloaded by GordonS on Sunday January 22, 2017 @08:11AM (#13455024)
I'd you are using a new IV when encrypting the new index then this won't work, since the old and new indexes will be completely different.
Re:Lavabit Reloaded by e12e on Monday January 23, 2017 @02:00AM (#13460396)
You would have to re-download the index after compaction. But the index and patches would be independent - you apply the decrypted patches to the decrypted index.
Re:Lavabit Reloaded by grapehut on Saturday January 21, 2017 @12:38PM (#13451105)
I'm not quite sure what you're getting at. It sounds like you're describing a known-plaintext attack, which modern ciphers are not vulnerable to. And what you are describing makes it seem like full disk encryption would be totally useless, but we know that's not the case.