I think one of the big things that has impacted SELinux adoption is that everyone has sort of seen it as a proactive booster rather than a really necessary part of a secure environment. I'm sure a lot of that is because lots of people are used to administering systems that were around before SELinux (and similar) was. For something that's perceived as a bonus point, it interferes far too often.
Most people don't realize SELinux is on until it does something really bad like stopping a database from restarting correctly or otherwise harming what's supposed to be a stable environment. When those are the stakes, SELinux does not have, or at least does not make immediately clear, a sufficient value proposition to incentivize the admin to fix the rules rather than just turning the whole thing off.
For example, to contrast with the OP, when SELinux stops Docker from doing something, the impulse is not going to be "Yay, SELinux stopped Docker from doing something dangerous! Thank you glorious SELinux!" Instead, it will be "Ugh, SELinux again getting in the way of stuff. I just need to disable that. I get enough headaches from Docker as-is and SELinux probably just isn't modern enough to handle my uber-charged stack with all of it's new-fangled features. Disabling!"
I'm too young to remember how it was in the old times (would be glad to hear a story or 2), but since my very first job, the internal policy (the real one - not the one presented to customer or auditors) has always been "scew firewall, selinux, principle of least privilege. Disable everything so it works right now and grant the dev team root access to the prod environments - they need it for an urgent customer issue!".