https://docs.oracle.com/cd/E23824_01/html/821-1456/rbac-1.ht...
It wasn't necessary to throw away POSIX history or concerns either.
http://www.cse.psu.edu/~trj1/cse443-s12/docs/ch6.pdf
The MLS model was too difficult to adapt to commercial use. Biba was good for stopping malware from overwriting files. They still preferred something more flexible. SCC then invented type enforcement in another high-assurance system:
https://web.archive.org/web/20160311233659/http://www.cyberd...
Flask architecture was combining that tech with a microkernel. SCC, acquired by McAfee, added type enforcement to a BSD OS for their Sidewinder firewall. The next work by Mitre was proof-of-concept for OSS by adding it to Linux. That and a pile of incremental additions is called SELinux. I'm sure you'll find the LOCK design a lot cleaner as it was originally intended. ;)
Also worth noting are the KeyKOS system (esp with KeySAFE), the capability-security machines, and one language-based mechanism:
http://www.cis.upenn.edu/~KeyKOS/
http://www.cs.washington.edu/homes/levy/capabook/index.html
http://www4.cs.fau.de/Projects/JX/
These collectively should keep you busy for a while. They're the kind of thing worth imitating or building on.
It's a rust userland built upon SEL4. SEL4 is very simplified in order to meet their verification goals so robigalia has to implement some interesting resource sharing primitives on top of it to get things to work. It could be interesting.
http://tunes.org/cliki/operating_20systems.html
You may want to dig around that entire site to get an idea of what people have tried to do (and frequently failed).
I wonder what a clean slate OS design would look like. One that satisfied the same requirements without any concerns about backward compatibility with POSIX history.
Does anyone know an OS with vaguely this goal?