> I don't think this is obvious to the general public.

My point was that I don't think it's obvious to the general public, either, that they can have any expectation after their key is compromised. Forward secrecy, some of them might have even heard about, particularly in the present climate where ssllabs is requiring it for its A grade.

> More importantly, this implies that the victim knows their key has been compromised.

I threw in some talk about my and the general public's expectations about the scenario where an endpoint's key is compromised, but I don't think I included knowing it actually happened among these expectations. The rootkit scenario which I expect as most common compromise (endpoint machine utterly compromised) kind of implied the user is none the wiser.

I'm not sure there's anyone out there that expects an Amiga guru meditation style alert saying "Your private key has been compromised!" to appear.

> The vast majority of key compromises are operational screwups with data disclosure, they generally do not lead to arbitrary code execution.

This is honestly surprising.