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Re:WhatsApp backdoor allows snooping on encrypted messages by mtgx on Friday January 13, 2017 @08:15AM (#13390546)
Did you miss this from the article?

> Boelter said: “[Some] might say that this vulnerability could only be abused to snoop on ‘single’ targeted messages, not entire conversations. This is not true if you consider that the WhatsApp server can just forward messages without sending the ‘message was received by recipient’ notification (or the double tick), which users might not notice. Using the retransmission vulnerability, the WhatsApp server can then later get a transcript of the whole conversation, not just a single message.”

In other words, what seems like "a vulnerability that only affects some messages" could be turned into a full blown interception capability with very little change.

Re:WhatsApp backdoor allows snooping on encrypted messages by evgen on Friday January 13, 2017 @09:44AM (#13391108)
It is just as easy to have the clients send a copy of all generated keys to a central server for storage, no need to bother with this re-transmission subterfuge at all.

What you are seeing is not some vast conspiracy, it is a compromise made by some back-end engineer to get a front-end product manager off their ass without anyone thinking through a better UI option.

"So if a user loses their phone you are telling me that all unread messages are lost forever?"

"Yes."

"That won't work. Users will complain, someone will have to deal with those complaints, this just won't work."

"Ok, maybe we just push the unread messages back to the sender's phone and automatically re-send when the recipient gets a new phone."

"Sure, that works. So, about this other problem..."

In retrospect, it is fairly obvious that the send needs some control over re-transmission, but if you have never been a situation like this it is only because no one uses your code.

Re:WhatsApp backdoor allows snooping on encrypted messages by mtgx on Friday January 13, 2017 @10:20AM (#13391431)
If a user loses their phone, I think they have a lot more to worry about than a few missed WhatsApp messages anyway. I don't think this is a "common sense" compromise that WhatsApp made here, especially in the context of them promising end-to-end encryption.

It's kind of like that other nonsense tech companies are doing these days, by supporting U2F auth, but then requiring you also set-up SMS auth in parallel, so that "if you lose your U2F key you can go back in with the SMS"

Yeah, except that completely eliminates the point of using a U2F key in the first place, since your security would be no better than when you're just using SMS auth.

Or we can go back to "security questions", which I think most agree now are just not worth it, despite the fact that they can help users "recover their passwords".

If end-to-end encrypted messages can be intercepted through this, then WhatsApp shouldn't be offering this feature. The downside is much greater than the upside.

Re:WhatsApp backdoor allows snooping on encrypted messages by arjie on Friday January 13, 2017 @10:45AM (#13391638)
If I lose my phone, I expect my new phone to have proper continuity on the messages. I'd rather have that than any encryption, to be honest. I don't care if the government spies on me. I do care if something someone sent me gets lost.
Re:WhatsApp backdoor allows snooping on encrypted messages by jdjb on Friday January 13, 2017 @11:11AM (#13391865)
Then don't use a messenger that promises end-to-end encryption. Client side encryption is all about ensuring only clients that hold private keys can read messages delivered to them.
Re:WhatsApp backdoor allows snooping on encrypted messages by arjie on Friday January 13, 2017 @06:39PM (#13395772)
More like, you can stop using this messenger because, guess what? It does what I want and not what you want. You move.
Re:WhatsApp backdoor allows snooping on encrypted messages by wowaname on Friday January 13, 2017 @12:31PM (#13392631)
You should at least have a backup of your private key so you can import it on your new phone rather than having the sender re-encrypt to whatever key your new phone decides to generate.