Re:Docker: insecure opening of file-descriptor allows privil...
by gtjay on Thursday January 12, 2017 @11:19PM
(#13388361)
> [...] you meant (on _RHEL_ xyz is the case) [...]
>
Totally on me. We fight against it, but it's hard not to have the implicit context of RHEL/Fed be omnipresent on the Red Hat bugzilla. In fact, when I wrote the comment in question I had just finished lighting my incense to the sīla of `systemd`... :)
Did not realize you were in Sydney. AU truly has the best hackers.
Thanks. :D
> Putting aside `ptrace` being the best way to guarantee a race win, the reason for my focus on `CAP_SYS_PTRACE` is that with SELinux enabled there is no other way to exploit having access to the file descriptors. Even if you explicitly try to pass a containerized process an external file descriptor "legitimately" (e.g. with `sendmsg`) SELinux will still ultimately block the access due to the type restrictions. This means that with `setenforce 1` you need to use something like code injection to get the external process to access the file descriptors on your behalf.
Ah okay, yeah I suspected that's what you meant (on _RHEL_ xyz is the case). Thanks for clarifying.