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Re:Docker: insecure opening of file-descriptor allows privil... by cyphar on Thursday January 12, 2017 @10:56PM (#13388303)
> Sorry for not seeing your comment until now. Amazingly great vuln BTW. It's early in 2017, but this is probably going to be one of this year's best.

Thanks. :D

> Putting aside `ptrace` being the best way to guarantee a race win, the reason for my focus on `CAP_SYS_PTRACE` is that with SELinux enabled there is no other way to exploit having access to the file descriptors. Even if you explicitly try to pass a containerized process an external file descriptor "legitimately" (e.g. with `sendmsg`) SELinux will still ultimately block the access due to the type restrictions. This means that with `setenforce 1` you need to use something like code injection to get the external process to access the file descriptors on your behalf.

Ah okay, yeah I suspected that's what you meant (on _RHEL_ xyz is the case). Thanks for clarifying.

Re:Docker: insecure opening of file-descriptor allows privil... by gtjay on Thursday January 12, 2017 @11:19PM (#13388361)
> [...] you meant (on _RHEL_ xyz is the case) [...] >

Totally on me. We fight against it, but it's hard not to have the implicit context of RHEL/Fed be omnipresent on the Red Hat bugzilla. In fact, when I wrote the comment in question I had just finished lighting my incense to the sīla of `systemd`... :)

Did not realize you were in Sydney. AU truly has the best hackers.