What I "need" to do is keep a very close eye on government and demand that they be able to justify their decisions.
This is starting to look a lot like some relationship drama, where the mother-in-law constantly sabotages the marriage with tiny annoyances and seeding doubt. "Did you leave the milk carton outside the fridge?". "No, but didn't your husband have coffee earlier?".
I am unmoved by attempts to cast acting in my own interests as feeding into the plans of the boogieman of the month.
This might be the fundamental question. What form of voluntary governance (i.e., not authoritarianism) does not require trust by the governed in the government?
If you are being honest with your comment, then you are unwittingly committing several logical fallacies:
- burden of proof: demanding confidential information that will never be provided ensures you will never receive "proof"
- moving the goalposts: this report includes several new analyses, but by moving the goalposts it will never be "enough"
- straw man: the issue is not restricted to DNC emails; at a minimum it includes manipulation of US social media platforms.
-The idea that some information is classified and some isn't is silly. There's just information that you're willing to divulge and information you're unwilling to divulge. I see no reason to assume evidence that would implicate Russia must be so sensitive that the government would never divulge it.
-I'm not moving any goalposts. There's only one piece of this puzzle I'm interested in: evidence linking Russia to the leaked emails. I accept that Russia has a broad propaganda network that often attempts to undermine US interests. I don't see that as an extraordinary thing.
-See above. I accept the astonishing amount of propaganda. But the emails are the key piece here, and there's no concrete information in this report.
I don't dismiss the DNI's claims, I just don't see the extraordinary evidence generally required for extraordinary claims.
This is the source and methods (or what I like to call S&M) debate.
Let's say your nephew wants to come out as gay. He tells only his mother. His mother tells you. Now you write on Facebook, "I just learned my nephew is gay. He will always be my nephew and I love him and his courage." Now your nephew knows his mom (your sister) blabbed.
This could have a ton of effects on your intelligence gathering network. For example, your sister might not want to tell you anything anymore. You just lost a source. Your nephew, feeling betrayed, might cut his mother out of his life. You just burned a source.
These are situations where even revealing judgments could lose sources. In situations where there are multiple sources, it becomes somewhat more difficult for your target to identify the leak, which gives you a larger safety margin.
So the question the intelligence agencies and the administration had to answer with this report is, "Are these judgments worth burning sources? If we reveal specific pieces of evidence, which are highly traceable to the original leak, can those sources be burned?"
Clearly, they made a call that you found unsatisfactory. But I hope you understand why they made that call.
I would love to see more of their raw data. I research social media and I have specifically investigated 2016 US election memes, so those data are extremely interesting to me. However, the DNI PDF states:
> This report is a declassified version of a highly classified assessment; its conclusions are identical to those in the highly classified assessment but this version does not include the full supporting information on key elements of the influence campaign.
So, irrespective of yours or my assessment of what the raw evidence might be like, DNI already stated that they think it's too sensitive. This probably isn't going to change for 10-20 years (which is a common lifespan for classified information) so you've just got to figure out a way to analyze this situation without the specific evidence used to create this report. It doesn't mean there isn't other evidence out there. Like I said: I research social media and I have my own evidence stack. Some of it is here:
https://iandennismiller.github.io/election-memes/
I am considering the events of the past 2 months as "moving the goalposts" - and this isn't a personal thing against you or any individual. Originally, we had statements from certain officials, but that wasn't enough. Then we had consensus among intelligence agencies, but again that's not enough. Then we had a statement from the president, but that's not enough. Now we have this report and it's still not enough.
On the straw man, the emails are not the entirety of the DNI argument, so reducing it to that creates the straw man, and dismissing the whole report on the basis of the emails is just how the straw man fallacy works, in practice. I am focused on social media, but you're focused on emails. It's okay to care more about one thing than another, but it is a logical fallacy to dismiss the rest of the report because you're not satisfied with the part you care about.
Lastly, I don't think it's extraordinary at all to claim that Russian intelligence managed hundreds of sock puppet accounts across Reddit, Facebook, Instagram, Imgur, Twitter, and other platforms. In fact, I would be shocked to learn that the opposite was true. In fact, none of the claims in the report are extraordinary; it's all extremely plausible.
My (sortof expert) opinion is that I think the DNI social media conclusions are plausible.
I know people who first said: "This is a CIA hitjob. The FBI and the NSA will never sign on to these accusations." Of course, now that the NSA has expressed "moderate" confidence and the CIA and FBI have expressed "high confidence" those people have mysteriously found other problems with this narrative.
I don't dismiss this report at all. It has solidified my belief in general Russian meddling (paid trolls, RT, propaganda, etc). But, in my opinion, that is old news (in fact, "Annex A" of the report is from 2012). My favorite piece of Russian propaganda is this "satellite photo" of a Ukrainian fighter firing a missile at MH17: http://i.dailymail.co.uk/i/pix/2014/11/14/1415993353768_wps_...
So, to me, the fact that Russian propaganda is constantly working to discredit the United States isn't an extraordinary thing: I take it for granted.
What seems extraordinary to me is the allegation that Russian intelligence leaked the emails through wikileaks and dcleaks. I don't think that claim is implausible and I haven't dismissed it, but I was hoping to see more evidence, that's all.
Hopefully I'll be alive in 20 years so when this stuff gets declassified I'll know if I was right or wrong!
Perfectly agreed. The United States and China also have these sock puppets, as do other countries. I think this is one of the reasons why people get into a tiffy whenever I insist on working with the facts and not US propaganda and rumors. Get accused of being a shill for Greece, Turkey, Russia, China, etc all the time.
Social media is swarming with sockpuppets, and now the game has escalated more, with H.R. 5181 passing in NDAA 2017, the Center for Global Engagement will be empowered to experiment with the techniques for social media propaganda developed by DARPA's SMISC program.
Don't know if the clock is moving toward midnight, or if just reddit is going to choke on itself.
Interesting. I hadn't heard of SMISC - thanks!
https://www.dni.gov/files/documents/ICA_2017_01.pdf p. 4:
> Russia used trolls as well as RT as part of its influence efforts to denigrate Secretary Clinton. This effort amplified stories on scandals about Secretary Clinton and the role of WikiLeaks in the election campaign.
> some social media accounts that appear to be tied to Russia’s professional trolls—because they previously were devoted to supporting Russian actions in Ukraine—started to advocate for President-elect Trump as early as December 2015
Of course, they could not have it and thus just be lying.
Of course I can only speculate on the juiciness (or not) of the details in the redacted half. The US government reflexively overclassifies things (perhaps to provide the enemy with an excess of possible targets) but I imagine some of it must be hyper-sensitive.
We should be having a discussion about how the desires of the intelligence community to spy have undercut the improvement of general security for personal data in the US. The email infrastructure of the Democratic campaign, seems more or less like a slightly below average standard email infrastructure used by most of the US (that's another shocking issue, but a side discussion at this point too).
The main issues IMHO are a) the intelligence community spying capability did not prevent this hack - why not, and b) we should consider that spying infrastructure requests and the legal implications of them holds back development of better security. Better general security for most private email & communications for citizens and businesses in the US would have been more effective in preventing the issue than spying capability.
But blaming the victim is just doing the aggressor's work. If russian agents broke into a power plant and blew it up, would you be writing about the need to fix the nation's fences.
I also disagree with your assessment that the DNC's security was "slightly below standards". They could have easily enabled two-factor authentication which would have foiled these hacking attempts – and the US agencies' agenda doesn't play into this story at all.
But it wasn't enabled, and that's one specific reason for calling it below standard... of what was even available in commercial technologies..
First, there's no doubt that RT is Russian propaganda. That's not news, and I'm unsure why it's in this kind of report. Paid russian internet trolls is an old accusation too. I think it's probably true but I don't see any concrete evidence in this report.
The real question here centers on the emails: did some Russian intelligence agency leak the DNC emails to wikileaks? The report asserts that this occurred, but again offers no concrete evidence. Instead it focuses on establishing motive.
We do have concrete evidence (published by crowdstrike) that Russian intel hacked the DNC. But we don't have concrete evidence linking the leaked emails to that hack.
I'm trying to remain objective here. I don't think it's unlikely that Russian intelligence was the source of the emails. I just don't see anything new here to conclusively prove that assertion.
Maybe I'm being too picky about what constitutes concrete evidence.