> I don't see how you can think that. What's an example of a world with objective morality but no objective good?
If, for example, I use minimizing pain as my moral barometer (this is utilitarianism), I believe in an objective morality without believing in an objective good.
I'm not going to punch Jimmy because hurting him that wouldn't be in line with minimizing pain and not because it would be "bad" to do so.
I don't see how you can think that. What's an example of a world with objective morality but no objective good?
> I think that's a very reductive position, and although analytically satisfying, it doesn't quite capture the intuitive meaning of "good" and "bad".
Evolutionary game theory ethics is what it's called. But yes, while it can explain natural facts about what we think is good and bad, it can't explain moral facts like what actually is good and bad. I highly recommend you read the paper I linked, because it covers a lot of ground and plenty of common objections against moral realism, even if you decide to stick with theism in the end.