Re:Kaspersky: SSL interception differentiates certificates w...
by jamesrom on Tuesday January 03, 2017 @05:34PM
(#13313830)
> I don't know why you're operating from the presumption that most security people know anything at all about basic cryptography
I don't know why you're operating from the presumption I'm talking about security people in general. I'm talking about the people at Kaspersky who were tasked with writing a SSL certificate store. I will also quote the bug report: "You don't have to be a cryptographer to understand a 32bit key is not enough to prevent brute-forcing a collision in seconds. In fact, producing a collision with any other certificate is trivial."
> Have you taken a second to even think about how this precise bug even makes sense as an implant? Hint: it does not make sense as an implant.
Hint: Pair this with a DNS spoof and you can pretend to be whatever website you want.
Re:Kaspersky: SSL interception differentiates certificates w...
by tptacek on Tuesday January 03, 2017 @05:35PM
(#13313841)
First: generalist software developers muck with TLS all the time. There's a whole huge class of enterprise automation and management software that also does custom TLS. How good do you think that stuff is? Do you think the companies that churn this stuff out hire TLS experts to build those components? Of course they don't.
If you'll take a second to look at the "goto fail" threads on HN, by the way, you'll see people every bit as committed to the idea that "goto fail was an inside job" as you are to this bug being enemy action.
Have you taken a second to even think about how this precise bug even makes sense as an implant? Hint: it does not make sense as an implant.