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Re:Tell HN: Linux Mint still serves their hash sums from htt... by sigjuice on Thursday December 29, 2016 @01:21PM (#13278946)
I don't know the details but any packages that you get served should include pgp signatures, that apt should verify before installation.
Re:Tell HN: Linux Mint still serves their hash sums from htt... by pOVTVOItY on Thursday December 29, 2016 @05:59PM (#13280965)
Private keys can be stolen or extracted via bribery, etc.
Re:Tell HN: Linux Mint still serves their hash sums from htt... by sigjuice on Friday December 30, 2016 @02:33PM (#13286697)
Are you saying if ubuntu served apt-gets over https, stolen private keys wouldn't be a problem?
Re:Tell HN: Linux Mint still serves their hash sums from htt... by pOVTVOItY on Friday December 30, 2016 @03:37PM (#13287213)
Multiple layers of security is industry practice.
Re:Tell HN: Linux Mint still serves their hash sums from htt... by sigjuice on Friday December 30, 2016 @04:22PM (#13287578)
Sure. In this particular setting, having both https and pgp is definitely better and a third layer would be even better, though I cannot think of one. Successful transfer from https Ubuntu mirror says my package was not tampered with during transmission, but nothing about the validity and integrity of the package itself. The Ubuntu project most likely does not have absolute control over the various mirrors available to users, so pgp verification provides a further assurance that mere https cannot.

If I had to chose between https and pgp, I would pick pgp. The OpenBSD project has a similar scheme (called signify).