Re:YubiKey for Windows Hello – Protect your Windows 10 login...
by petejansson on Saturday December 24, 2016 @07:50AM
(#13249604)
A serious problem with biometrics is credential revocation. The best answer I've seen to this is using the biometric to locally unlock some other credential like a certificate that can be revoked. There are other problems that are flashier, like spoofing and liveness, but revocation is a real show-stopper that is frequently ignored.
Re:YubiKey for Windows Hello – Protect your Windows 10 login...
by nickik on Saturday December 24, 2016 @06:42PM
(#13252122)
The new FIDO UAF standard solves exactly this problem, all biometrics are only unlocking a local identifier preferable on Secure Element or in a Trust Zone.
Re:YubiKey for Windows Hello – Protect your Windows 10 login...
by lima on Saturday December 24, 2016 @09:20AM
(#13249846)
Those are considered deprecated by now. The most important issue with those devices is that they're not secure against phishing.
If you accidentally input your credentials and PIN code in a phishing site, it's game over.
With FIDO tokens, this is impossible - authentication is challenge-response based and tied to the encrypted channel. Your device contains a private key which is used to authenticate. This requires two-way communication, so you have to plug in the device.
Re:YubiKey for Windows Hello – Protect your Windows 10 login...
by seanp2k2 on Saturday December 24, 2016 @10:00AM
(#13250006)
What makes it impossible for a phishing site to mimic the challenge?
Re:YubiKey for Windows Hello – Protect your Windows 10 login...
by lima on Saturday December 24, 2016 @12:03PM
(#13250549)
The challenge-response protocol is using assymetric cryptography and is tied to the SSL session ID.
More explanations on why: https://security.stackexchange.com/questions/71316/how-secur...
And how: https://fidoalliance.org/specs/fido-u2f-v1.0-nfc-bt-amendmen...
Re:YubiKey for Windows Hello – Protect your Windows 10 login...
by nickik on Saturday December 24, 2016 @06:48PM
(#13252136)
Thata the clever bit about FIDO. Part of what unlocks the private key for signing the challenge is somehing called AppId. AppId is automatically captured by your webbrowser (weborigin standard) and passed along. So the authenticator only unlooks if you are on the correct website.
A further feature is that you can make the ssl tunnel id part of this as well, that makes it even better.
This is how both UAF and U2F work.
For laptop and mobile devices, I like the idea of password and biometrics (finger print reader and/or facial recognition).