Re:Rolling Your Own Crypto
by loup-vaillant on Thursday December 22, 2016 @07:44AM
(#13236882)
I have thought about it and re-read the original paper. I stand by my claim.
The truth of the matter is, poly1305, while provably secure, is almost as impractical as a one time pad: it relies on a shared random authentication key. Where does that key is supposed to come from? In practice, you'd derive it from a session key (and so rely on a symmetric cipher such as AES or Chacha), or from a key exchange scheme such as Diffie-Hellman, and you rely on that.
I left my phrasing as it was, because it is (I think) closer to the truth, and not dangerous. I do reckon the AEAD scheme I recommend only has a reduction proof, not a safety proof. I could be more precise, but I don't like clutter.
The truth of the matter is, poly1305, while provably secure, is almost as impractical as a one time pad: it relies on a shared random authentication key. Where does that key is supposed to come from? In practice, you'd derive it from a session key (and so rely on a symmetric cipher such as AES or Chacha), or from a key exchange scheme such as Diffie-Hellman, and you rely on that.
I left my phrasing as it was, because it is (I think) closer to the truth, and not dangerous. I do reckon the AEAD scheme I recommend only has a reduction proof, not a safety proof. I could be more precise, but I don't like clutter.