Well, yeah, it is.

Defence against (crypto-buzzword) state-level actors (SLAs) doesn't start with gpg and FDE, rather, with operational security, or, even better, not being a worthwhile target in the first place (if your briefcase of secret documents is already on CNN there is no need to infiltrate your stuff beyond gaining assurance that you don't have another briefcase - which is the thing you want to proof as publicly as possible to convince your highly paranoid adversary)

There is that saying "never trust a computer you can't throw out the window". Computers are networked. You're trusting a network of computers, even if you don't use "networked functionality". Can you throw the internet out the window? Probably not! Hence, don't trust computers. People who trust computers to keep their secrets are foolish¹ (Trottel), so just don't.

¹ Notice how governments²³ trust computers to keep their secrets safe, and how admirably and totally that failed. Ask yourself, what wasn't leaked by Snowden? Stuff that wasn't in any computer in the first place!

² Or how celebrities trusted computers to keep their dickpics safe.

³ Or how companies trusted computers to keep their business secrets, well, uh, secret.

To make my point another way: Computers are for disseminating information. If secrecy is more important than dissemination, then don't use a computer.