I don't see why this level of security couldn't be used to randomly and deterministically assign crypto keys that are used for some kind of blockchain voting scheme. Put a thousand pre-known keys in a hat, one thousand people draw keys from a hat, the key is activated on the blockchain and points to a user-defined voting wallet. Now you have anonymous cryptographically verifiable voting with double spend protection. Am I missing something?
Voting wallets? Assign crypto keys? You mean just like issuing a ballot? How would someone do a recount? An end-to-end audit? Keep track of who was assigned which key (thereby destroying the secret ballot)? Who voted and who didn't? How do you handle provisional ballots? Etc.
PM me once your proposal satisfies the requirements (works as a replacement) for current election administration systems.
Okay, maybe I'm being too dismissive, which I normally hate. But blockchains, crypto, signatures are not magical. Design the whole system, make it auditable while accounting for information leakage, simulate a few real world elections. Do the leg work, unlike Chaum, Rivet, others. THEN we can talk.
"Scantegrity II Municipal Election at Takoma Park: The First E2E Binding Governmental Election with Ballot Privacy"
http://static.usenix.org/event/sec10/tech/full_papers/Carbac...
With the prior Punchscan system, voter privacy is accomplished thru hash collisions. Hiding your ballot in a herd of ballots cast. A trick that works only if your herd (precinct) is large enough and your ballots are simple enough. Definitely would not work (protect voter privacy) in my jurisdiction.
Side note about IRV, as used in Maryland Park: It's now a non-starter. After the handful of well-studied experiments, election administrators are dead set against it. Ballots are complicated, voter education is tough, and IRV necessitates electronic tabulation, which rules out legally required manual recounts. (My jurisdiction often gets over 500k ballots. IRV is not feasible here.)
People lose wads of cash that are valuable to them; they're going to care even less about their electronic verification file.
Might as well just vote then and there
Your jurisdiction's voter registration database is (hopefully) up to date. YMMV. Note that verified reports of registration fraud are very, very few. Whereas caging, purging are fairly common.
Briefly, On election day: voter shows up to correct poll site, shows some kind of ID (YMMV), name found in that location's poll book, voter signs in, ballot is issued, voter marks ballot, voter casts ballot. If there's any error (question) during this process, voter is issued a provisional ballot, to be adjudicated out of band.
Ballots are counted before the polls open and again when the polls close. The bookkeeping is simple and easily verified.
Everything is bundled in tamper evident seals, observed and signed by members of opposing parties, physically escorted by opposing members, etc.