So a voting system with less of a strategy problem could make common knowledge of real voter preferences easier to arrive at -- the preferences people would honestly vote by, given the chance. You could still have just two major parties, but disciplined by a real option of serious competition if they don't address these no-longer-deniable preferences.
Caveats: 1. AFAIK we still need a clearer understanding of how much strategy people exercise in approval or score voting in practice, once they've gotten used to the new system. And 2. these are just my thoughts as a random citizen trying to see to a way to less large-scale insanity. I'm not a political scientist and I haven't seen one say anything like this about common knowledge and voting systems.
No, they don't. Heck, even many systems that do use FPTP (e.g., the UK) support more parties with representation in the main national legislative body than the US.
A two-party system isn't one where merely there are two stronger parties that tend to form governments or executive administrations.
Because that is the case in many countries, even countries which don't do FPTP, even countries which do things that people argue are good electorally, and that does not seem like a categorical improvement over what happens in, say, the US.
No, it's emphatically not, especially if you mean exclusively forms the government (not in a coalition.) And, if you don't mean that, it's pretty substantially weaker than the duopoly in the US.
Heck, even FPTP systems that aren't also Presidential systems (another structural factor that reduces competitive parties) generally don't do what you describe, at least in the form of exclusively non-coalition governments.
> and that does not seem like a categorical improvement over what happens in, say, the US.
Whether the difference is merely a substantial quantitative improvement with some creatively-defined common category or a categorical improvement is ultimately immaterial.