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Re:When A.I. Matures, It May Call Jürgen Schmidhuber ‘Dad’ by rl3 on Tuesday November 29, 2016 @06:54PM (#13067279)
>Dr. Schmidhuber also has a grand vision for A.I. — that self-aware or “conscious machines” are just around the corner — that causes eyes to roll among some of his peers.

I can't help but wonder if the sole reason AGI doesn't exist is because it hasn't been figured out yet.

While that statement sounds obvious on the face of it, the implication is that we may already possess both the sufficient computational resources and human intelligence to realize its creation.

Re:When A.I. Matures, It May Call Jürgen Schmidhuber ‘Dad’ by Russell91 on Tuesday November 29, 2016 @09:00PM (#13067824)
We certainly have enough compute at this point. 10^15 flops should be more than enough to run the brain by pretty much any analysis. Part of the issue is that evolution had at least 1 million such creatures over 52,000,000 weeks to improve since monkeys. So while human intelligent design of AI will certainly be a better algorithm than evolution, we may actually be a bit shy computationally of easily training an AI system, in spite of having more than enough to realize one.
Re:When A.I. Matures, It May Call Jürgen Schmidhuber ‘Dad’ by oh_sigh on Tuesday November 29, 2016 @07:11PM (#13067370)
It doesn't really tell us much. There is no reason ancient Athens or Taixue or Gundishapur couldn't have developed calculus or Newtonian physics. No resource was limiting them in the development, but those fields weren't developed until 1600+ years later.
Re:When A.I. Matures, It May Call Jürgen Schmidhuber ‘Dad’ by bcaulfield on Tuesday November 29, 2016 @07:22PM (#13067417)
Re:When A.I. Matures, It May Call Jürgen Schmidhuber ‘Dad’ by NotUsingLinux on Wednesday November 30, 2016 @08:21AM (#13070412)
That is so cool...
Re:When A.I. Matures, It May Call Jürgen Schmidhuber ‘Dad’ by NotUsingLinux on Wednesday November 30, 2016 @08:21AM (#13070410)
I think the printing press was a key invention which was needed for this. So many great things got lost because in history there was only 1 or few copies of it.
Re:When A.I. Matures, It May Call Jürgen Schmidhuber ‘Dad’ by BickNowstrom on Wednesday November 30, 2016 @07:13AM (#13070069)
AGI (as in, a mathematical theory of universal intelligence) has already been figured out by one of Schmidhuber's students, and, proven to be uncomputable: we may never have sufficient computational resources.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/AIXI

Re:When A.I. Matures, It May Call Jürgen Schmidhuber ‘Dad’ by eli_gottlieb on Wednesday November 30, 2016 @01:33PM (#13073315)
AIXI is a pretty deeply flawed theory of "universal intelligence". It can't handle modelling itself, it can't really handle the large dimensionality of its hypothesis space, it can't really handle imprecise stimulus information, and it can be made arbitrarily "stupid" in terms of "lost" rewards by selecting a Universal Turing machine to do the Solomonoff Induction over for which the "right" programs are arbitrarily long. And all of that is before we get to mere computational limitations or the uncomputability issue.
Re:When A.I. Matures, It May Call Jürgen Schmidhuber ‘Dad’ by BickNowstrom on Wednesday November 30, 2016 @03:46PM (#13074533)
> AIXI is a pretty deeply flawed theory of "universal intelligence"

What would you propose as an alternative? If nothing, fine, but how can we relate, when we only have a single best (or if you prefer: flawed) thing?

> It can't handle modelling itself

It can add its internal states to the environment, and hence model these internal states.

> the large dimensionality of its hypothesis space

Its bounded by how many compressors / programs are available to it. Calculating the length of these programs that are consistent with the environment is feasible.

> handle imprecise stimulus information

I'm not sure if you mean imprecise stimuli here or imprecise sensors.

> can be made arbitrarily "stupid"

This can be seen as a flaw, or as a simple property (or even a feature). Something that can be optimal, and "stupid", does not detract much from its ability to be optimal.

> before we get to mere computational limitations or the uncomputability issue

Just because it is uncomputable, does not mean the theory is flawed. Sure, it is not practical, and we like practical things, but it is still valuable to have such a theory. Especially when approximations do yield practical applications.

Marcus Hutter on these issues: http://hunch.net/?cat=14

Re:When A.I. Matures, It May Call Jürgen Schmidhuber ‘Dad’ by eli_gottlieb on Wednesday November 30, 2016 @05:56PM (#13075470)
>What would you propose as an alternative? If nothing, fine, but how can we relate, when we only have a single best (or if you prefer: flawed) thing?

I tend to favor Karl Friston's "free-energy minimization" theory of the brain. For specifying tasks in engineering situations, I like the KL-control paradigm: the agent's task is to minimize (via the normal mechanisms of active inference) the Kullback-Liebler divergence between its induced distribution over latent variables (ie: causal models of the world) and some "target" distribution.

>It can add its internal states to the environment, and hence model these internal states.

No, it can't. I'd have to do a bunch of work to sketch some proofs, but without the ability to consider multiple observable random variables and use hierarchical Bayes on them, AIXI will not be able to detect that certain environmental states are actually equivalent to its own internal states. Hell, since Solomonoff Induction is incomputable, it's not even in its own hypothesis space, so it can never locate a program that generates itself.

>Its bounded by how many compressors / programs are available to it. Calculating the length of these programs that are consistent with the environment is feasible.

See below, please.

>I'm not sure if you mean imprecise stimuli here or imprecise sensors.

Both. From the perspective of any possible reasoning device, the problem is simply low likelihood precision (that is, high variance/entropy of the likelihood function). If I have so much noise in my sensory stimulus that all I see is 50% "heads" and 50% "tails" in my input bits, without any ordering to those bits, then I do not have the information to infer any complex causal structure (ie: the real world) behind those bits.

The point being: when the environment is noisy, it forces the mind to favor simpler explanations, even when those explanations are not the Truth, due to the parameter space over possible Truths (for example, random seeds added to some causal structure) being too large and spreading out the probability mass too thinly. Since Solomonoff Induction deals with algorithmically random programs as its hypothesis space, this means that any noise in the environment sufficient to add one bit of random seed to the shortest generating program cuts the probability mass allocated to the correct hypothesis by half.

>This can be seen as a flaw, or as a simple property (or even a feature). Something that can be optimal, and "stupid", does not detract much from its ability to be optimal.

AIXI is only optimal for a given Turing machine (ie: state-machine with alphabet). The "arbitrarily stupid prior" thing is just to say that for any program, we can create a Turing machine for which that program takes up arbitrarily much tape-space, thus making that program arbitrarily improbable in the Solomonoff Measure over that Turing machine's programs.

>Just because it is uncomputable, does not mean the theory is flawed. Sure, it is not practical, and we like practical things, but it is still valuable to have such a theory. Especially when approximations do yield practical applications.

Hence why I called them "mere" computational issues.