News for hackers. Stuff that matters.
Re:Neutralize ME Firmware on SandyBridge and IvyBridge Platf... by yuhong on Monday November 28, 2016 @03:49PM (#13058287)
AFAIK the remote network access ("AMT") has to be specifically enabled.
Re:Neutralize ME Firmware on SandyBridge and IvyBridge Platf... by nitrogen on Monday November 28, 2016 @04:00PM (#13058366)
Some of the paranoia around ME is the possibility of undocumented commands or magic byte sequences in software or via network interface that give an attacker invisible control of the ME without the user enabling AMT. The NIC is probably still powered and active for WoL.

It's also conceivable that a state-level adversary could have hidden arbitrary DMA instructions in a NIC firmware, that only activate with a signed request embedded in a random packet. Some of the largest firmware blobs on Linux systems are for NICs.

Most people aren't facing state-level targeted attacks, but without open firmware, it's nearly impossible to know for sure if one is vulnerable. And, with botnets and worms, it only takes one non-state-level attacker discovering the backdoor for everyone to be affected.

Re:Neutralize ME Firmware on SandyBridge and IvyBridge Platf... by kevin_b_er on Monday November 28, 2016 @05:09PM (#13058846)
http://people.kth.se/~maguire/DEGREE-PROJECT-REPORTS/100402-...

PDF Page 66

This attack could be used indefinite times to compromise the Intel’s AMT remote provisioning process and subverts the security of the non configured PCs that include the AMT functionality even while it is disabled within the BIOS configuration as presented in section 3.7.6.

AMT is always active, even if you've set it to "Disabled" and can be remotely activated. Again, without your authorization.

Re:Neutralize ME Firmware on SandyBridge and IvyBridge Platf... by igor_sk on Monday December 05, 2016 @12:53PM (#13107482)
The paper is nice, however it covers an ancient AMT version. AFAIK this won't work on recent versions (it has saner defaults).