Re:Announcing SSL Labs Grading Changes for 2017
by baby on Saturday November 19, 2016 @01:44AM
(#12992383)
I think you're over estimating both the practicality of these attacks and the operations at the NSA. This just does not make sense to compute such an attack. Especially when they are other vulnerabilities, easier to find, and with much more efficient targeting. A debate about AES-128 vs AES-256 is useless when people are still using non-authenticated encryption, non cryptographic PRNGs, etc...
2 petabytes is no big deal for the NSA. Also, why would they store anywhere near this much per session? They can estimate which part of the stream matters and store that part if they want to.
> And for each of these AES operations they also have to check in their 2 petabytes corpus for a match (I hope you way to do that).
Bloom filter plus a large hash table?
The point is that crypto ought to be configured to be secure, with a large margin of error, against an adversary who controls the entire world's computational capacity and is willing to use highly theoretical attacks because achieving this level of security is not particularly difficult. AES-256 satisfies this criterion, as does ECDHE until a quantum computer shows up. AES-128 does not satisfy this criterion even though the existing attacks are barely practical even for a nation-state adversary.
256-bit keys may not even be quite good enough against a batch attack done with a quantum computer because a full Grover's algorithm run against the entire batch runs in ~sqrt(2^bits / batch size). If you assume a batch size of 2^96 (to give a nice margin of error) and you want a work factor of 2^128 for the adversary, that gives 352 bits.
ECDHE is, of course, completely dead once someone builds a quantum computer.