Now, we're looking at a top-notch team of OS programmers; presumably, they all have access to do that audit themselves, and at least some of them must be ethical and proficient enough to notice and refuse to ship a backdoor, right? But the influence of a state actor given 14 years to compromise a team shouldn't be dismissed out of hand.
Kaspersky AV hobbles my core i7 to the point where it can't even respond to keypresses. I have no view on its anti-virus abilities, but my every experience of it (the client and the management tools) is that it's shoddy enterprise churnware.
And, of course, they also promote it as if it's the best thing ever.
I guess the OS team could be the best ever. But my starting position is "ha ha, as if".
That said, they are apparently stable enough to emulate enough of Linux that from another OS that you can simulate a Linux OS as a container and run software as if it's on Linux.[1] So, to my mind that implies that while they may not be formally specified, it's not too hard to look at what's actually implemented and treat that as a sort of loose spec.
As someone who has been paying attention to this space for some time I welcome anything new that increases exposure. It's cool stuff, and it's probably the future. However, there's a long way to go. Security doesn't stop at the operating system. In fact, the vast majority of security breaches occur due to misconfiguration, bugs, or good old fashioned social engineering. To really build a system that's "secure in principle" you can't stop at the operating system: you need to build a toolchain that makes it easy to build user space applications that are also "secure in principal" and you need to work on the HCI so the security model makes sense / isn't defeated by users. That's going to be a lot of work!