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A comment on The status of Linux kernel hardening. Parent comment

Re:The status of Linux kernel hardening by kodroid on Thursday November 10, 2016 @05:46AM (#12919307)
This would sort of negate the purpose of ASLR, as afaik the whole point is an attacker would not know the mem layout. The very fact its not reproducible is the solution and the problem!
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Re:The status of Linux kernel hardening by eeZah7Ux on Thursday November 10, 2016 @08:15AM (#12920059)
No. If the seed would be made available only in a kernel bug report.
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Re:The status of Linux kernel hardening by wyldfire on Thursday November 10, 2016 @09:25AM (#12920562)
Yes, that is what frederikvs probably means but access to the seed could become a new weakest link of ASLR. Presumably only available to CAP_SYS_ADMIN/uid 0, but it's worth a great deal of caution in designing the feature that allows determining what the seed was.
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Re:The status of Linux kernel hardening by nickpsecurity on Thursday November 10, 2016 @09:29AM (#12920595)
Further adding to that, the seed could be changed before that bug report was submitted. A dedicated tool with a FSM and minimal privileges does it. That lets us verify it strongly.
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