A Formal Security Analysis of the Signal Messaging Protocol

Re:A Formal Security Analysis of the Signal Messaging Protocol by CaptSpify on Tuesday November 08, 2016 @10:57AM (#12901221)

Don't get me wrong: We absolutely need both

But fixing the client when the host is still insecure/unknown is just going to move the target. If messages are secure, governments are just going to move to the OS-layer.

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Re:A Formal Security Analysis of the Signal Messaging Protocol by cortesoft on Tuesday November 08, 2016 @07:49PM (#12905286)

So you have two attack vectors, the OS host and the client application; why is it bad to secure the client? It doesn't ADD any attack vectors. What is the point in saying "Let's not secure the client software until the OS is secured"? It isn't like these are the same people working on the problem; Moxie isn't going to suddenly start working on securing iOS if he isn't working on OWS.

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Re:A Formal Security Analysis of the Signal Messaging Protocol by CaptSpify on Tuesday November 08, 2016 @09:26PM (#12905645)

I don't disagree with you. This is a multi-pronged problem and we need multi-pronged solutions. I just think the OS is a higher priority than a texting-client

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