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Re:MicroG Project: A re-implementation of Google's Android a... by dawidloubser on Thursday November 03, 2016 @12:19PM (#12865318)
Will this, by any chance, increase the number of open-source apps available in f-droid? Every now and then, I spot a wonderful app that is only not available due to dependencies on one or two proprietary Google APIs or components.

I'm trying to run a totally open-source android installation, and have opted-out of Google entirely. It's worked out fairly well so far, but the app choices are fairly limited, of course.

Re:MicroG Project: A re-implementation of Google's Android a... by bradyo on Thursday November 03, 2016 @01:18PM (#12865921)
I don't think f-droid will accept apps that have a requirement on the Google play services framework, even if you can somehow reproducibly compile against the microg version instead.

But it does mean you can install apps on the play store that have a dependency on gsf but are otherwise open-source (e.g. maps.me, signal, tomahawk).

Re:MicroG Project: A re-implementation of Google's Android a... by xchip on Thursday November 03, 2016 @12:43PM (#12865573)
Cool! Do you have any blog post explaining how to do it?
Re:MicroG Project: A re-implementation of Google's Android a... by adilparvez on Thursday November 03, 2016 @02:08PM (#12866406)
This is not very detailed but it might help: https://blog.adilparvez.com/post/2016/10/31/1/cyanogenmustar...
Re:MicroG Project: A re-implementation of Google's Android a... by voltagex_ on Thursday November 03, 2016 @07:28PM (#12869046)
>Signal: End-to-end encrypted messaging over the internet. (You can get it on APKMirror.)

Isn't that a good way to get a modified / malware version of Signal? Anyone can upload to APKMirror, can't they?

Re:MicroG Project: A re-implementation of Google's Android a... by cyphar on Thursday November 03, 2016 @11:11PM (#12870076)
There's an fdroid repo[1] for it, but I'm not sure I trust the person running it. Because of the lovely conversations with moxie the main fdroid repo got taken down. Don't you just love free software projects that hate giving users freedom.

[1]: https://fdroid.eutopia.cz/

Re:MicroG Project: A re-implementation of Google's Android a... by adilparvez on Friday November 04, 2016 @09:42AM (#12872440)
That is a really good point, I actually got someone else to get it from the play store then copied it, the updates from apkmirror are then fine since the signatures match. I'll edit the post to say, get it from a trusted source.

This is also useful: http://www.onyxbits.de/raccoon It's a dektop play store client. I tried it out a while back and it worked, don't know about now.

Re:MicroG Project: A re-implementation of Google's Android a... by bradyo on Thursday November 03, 2016 @02:14PM (#12866456)
This is a very clean and straightforward article demonstrating how to do it! Nice work.
Re:MicroG Project: A re-implementation of Google's Android a... by bradyo on Thursday November 03, 2016 @01:28PM (#12866027)
the Izzy on droid blog has a series of posts about it: https://android.izzysoft.de/articles/named/android-without-g...

Edit: The series is a little out of date, but should give you the general idea. ROMs that are probably new since that article was published that have no google dependencies are Replicant (entirely libre), OmniROM, Copperhead OS, and CyanagenMod w/ a no-gapps-script.

Re:MicroG Project: A re-implementation of Google's Android a... by dublinben on Thursday November 03, 2016 @12:53PM (#12865683)
It's nothing complicated or special. Just install your AOSP-based ROM of choice, and only use software from F-Droid.
Re:MicroG Project: A re-implementation of Google's Android a... by ex3ndr on Thursday November 03, 2016 @01:08PM (#12865822)
Only once f-droid stop being such big security hole.
Re:MicroG Project: A re-implementation of Google's Android a... by ptx on Thursday November 03, 2016 @01:35PM (#12866090)
In which way is it a security hole?
Re:MicroG Project: A re-implementation of Google's Android a... by codethief on Thursday November 03, 2016 @01:43PM (#12866167)
I think what OP is referring to is that the apps on F-Droid are not signed by their respective developers but by the people behind F-Droid. This is the reason (or one of the reasons?) for instance why Moxie from OpenWhisperSystems doesn't want Signal to be available through F-Droid.
Re:MicroG Project: A re-implementation of Google's Android a... by catdog on Thursday November 03, 2016 @02:20PM (#12866508)
Thats not entirely correct, if the build is reproducible the upstream apk with the upstream signature can be published: https://f-droid.org/wiki/page/Deterministic,_Reproducible_Bu...
Re:MicroG Project: A re-implementation of Google's Android a... by codethief on Thursday November 03, 2016 @03:15PM (#12867048)
Oops, I didn't know about that feature. Thanks for pointing that out!
Re:MicroG Project: A re-implementation of Google's Android a... by jalami on Thursday November 03, 2016 @06:04PM (#12868412)
Fdroid allows you to run your own repo and up your own builds. MicroG does this, so these are built by them. More devs should do this. Fdroid building everything isn't scalable nor is it a good trust paradigm. I agree with them that they should only build from source, but others should maintain their own. Email is federated, why not app stores?

Edit: [0] https://f-droid.org/wiki/page/Setup_an_FDroid_App_Repo

Re:MicroG Project: A re-implementation of Google's Android a... by zanny on Thursday November 03, 2016 @06:34PM (#12868666)
Because adding a repo via some random online URL is the exact same reason why downloading random Windows executables creates tons of opportunities for malware to infect computers.

The whole point of software stores is giving users the ability to trust the motives of the software they install, because the store and / or its users would never condone hostile software being hosted there.

Once you start having everyone run their own F-Droid repos, you are having independent developers give you their own trust keys, but you have no one else who needed to verify those developers were legitimate.

F-Droid itself is not particularly secure, given anyone can upload anything there, but in the same way the Archlinux AUR, OpenSUSE Build Service, Ubuntu Launchpad, etc work those third party software repositories are at least hosted by a trusted maintainer of the store / repo itself. If anyone ever uploaded malware there, once found out, it would be taken down and the responsible users banned.

With distributed app stores under F-Droid, or the equivalent third party repos for Arch / Suse / Ubuntu, the host has absolutely no control over the behavior of third parties, and thus anyone can host all the hostile malware they want, and if users add those repos they give them absolute trust in doing so.

That isn't a valid security model by any estimation.

Re:MicroG Project: A re-implementation of Google's Android a... by jalami on Thursday November 03, 2016 @06:53PM (#12868801)
You trust Facebook when you log into Facebook.com. Facebook.com/fdroid would be the hypothetical trusted endpoint for Facebook apps. You should not have one gatekeeper that ensures everything is safe. They can sensor content, fail to catch something or prioritize some apps over others. Having a default repo where there are restrictions, rules and vigilance makes sense, but you should be able to opt into another circle of trust AND get notified of updates, changes, version numbers etc. If you can't trust a company enough to run their binary, then don't add their repo.

The alternative is download static apks today and maintain updates yourself(bad) or remove the freedom to install what you want on your device.

Re:MicroG Project: A re-implementation of Google's Android a... by zanny on Thursday November 03, 2016 @11:19PM (#12870102)
For the vast majority of software I imagine most users do not have a relationship with the vendor going in. Independent repos naturally can (and do) work for large software. For example, the Mega client for Linux is provided as its own self-hosted repo by Mega Ltd, where they provide repositories for most distros.

But for, say, an app for a restaurant or a document reader, you would not know or have any reason to trust the vendor, so if they are self-hosting their own repos you are taking a tremendous risk trusting them.

The end result would probably remain the same - users might use third party repos for huge popular apps, but small apps would still need to stay centralized because there is no way to introduce a viable trust model against an organization you never interacted with before.

Re:MicroG Project: A re-implementation of Google's Android a... by jalami on Friday November 04, 2016 @10:51AM (#12872999)
I think people trust too much generally. That's not going to change with any paradigm put forth. However if you're running binaries from vendors you don't trust, you're playing with fire even in a regulated app store.

Most people don't change their default browser, adding third party repos would be similar. Removing the ability for the owner of a device to install software they want fixes one symptom, not the main issue of trust. Also it makes your device into a glorified feature phone. No thanks.

Re:MicroG Project: A re-implementation of Google's Android a... by pritambaral on Friday November 04, 2016 @01:25AM (#12870568)
OT and FYI: I think you meant 'censor' instead of 'sensor'
Re:MicroG Project: A re-implementation of Google's Android a... by jalami on Friday November 04, 2016 @10:33AM (#12872823)
Oops, was writing on my mobile. Can't edit it now, thanks though.
Re:MicroG Project: A re-implementation of Google's Android a... by ptx on Friday November 04, 2016 @07:26AM (#12871727)
Isn't that precisely the same way it works on a normal GNU/Linux system, though? Packages are compiled and signed by Debian or Red Hat (or whatever distribution you're running), not by the original developer, and that's perfectly fine – in fact better, because there's some level of quality control being performed by the distribution packagers. Just like the F-Droid packagers.
Re:MicroG Project: A re-implementation of Google's Android a... by bradyo on Thursday November 03, 2016 @01:39PM (#12866126)
Re:MicroG Project: A re-implementation of Google's Android a... by kuschku on Thursday November 03, 2016 @02:42PM (#12866727)
Which is not correct. If F-Droid’s reproducible build system can get the same result as your own build, you can distribute your own, self-signed version through F-Droid.

In other words, moxie is wrong. Again.

Re:MicroG Project: A re-implementation of Google's Android a... by bradyo on Thursday November 03, 2016 @03:09PM (#12866994)
To be fair, Moxie appears to have been right at the time of writing the linked comment according to the commit timestamp. Thanks to you (and the comment or above for the link) for pointing this out though. TIL. The documentation does say it is unlikely and other documentation has not been updated to point to this feature, such as the developer FAQ: https://f-droid.org/wiki/page/FAQ_-_App_Developers#Can_APKs_...
Re:MicroG Project: A re-implementation of Google's Android a... by icebraining on Thursday November 03, 2016 @01:31PM (#12866046)
What do you mean?
Re:MicroG Project: A re-implementation of Google's Android a... by bradyo on Thursday November 03, 2016 @01:39PM (#12866121)
See Moxie's explanation here: https://github.com/WhisperSystems/Signal-Android/issues/127#...

The whole thread is a good read too haha

Re:MicroG Project: A re-implementation of Google's Android a... by icebraining on Thursday November 03, 2016 @03:25PM (#12867131)
Even without reproducible builds, that's as "insecure" as any Linux distro. Frankly, I can very well live with the F-Droid maintainers keeping the signing keys.
Re:MicroG Project: A re-implementation of Google's Android a... by cyphar on Thursday November 03, 2016 @05:40PM (#12868246)
And apparently f-droid has reproducible builds now.