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Re:The DrK Attack: De-randomizing Kernel ASLR by josteink on Wednesday October 26, 2016 @11:31AM (#12797268)
To me it seems like every time intel tries to create a security safeguard, it almost always without exception ends up being a new attack-vector instead (see "x86 considered harmful").

I'd love to run simpler versions of the modern intel cpus stripped of all this insecure bloat.

Surely I can't be the only one?

Re:The DrK Attack: De-randomizing Kernel ASLR by willvarfar on Wednesday October 26, 2016 @11:39AM (#12797354)
(Mill CPU team)

I'm putting together a security white paper at the moment. We've been quiet because we've been real busy and we have more new stuff to talk about if only we had time to write it up for public, so watch this space :)

Re:The DrK Attack: De-randomizing Kernel ASLR by djsumdog on Wednesday October 26, 2016 @12:32PM (#12797893)
We can't even get newer x86/64 boards without closed binary blobs everywhere. Look at Librem. I think the last truly open laptop in the x86 world was the X200 Thinkpad.

All the newer opensource laptops are all ARM based, which is just going to mean a lot of fragmentation until things like the ARM config/device-tree stuff catches up to EFI.

Re:The DrK Attack: De-randomizing Kernel ASLR by nickpsecurity on Wednesday October 26, 2016 @01:34PM (#12798555)
There's potentially room for a cloud or datacenter company to pull it off by paying Intel to do it via semi-custom business they have. Or AMD who started that model in x86. Just the high-performance HW and microcode without any other crap with other stuff in trust boundary offloaded to coprocessors we can build and verify. We can also add in some real security like in Watchdog or CHERI CPU's while we're at it. CHERI already runs FreeBSD so we'd have that immediately if we ported their toolchain to x86.
Re:The DrK Attack: De-randomizing Kernel ASLR by anonymousDan on Wednesday October 26, 2016 @02:55PM (#12799333)
What has tsx got to do with security? It's for efficient transactional memory.
Re:The DrK Attack: De-randomizing Kernel ASLR by 0xfeba on Wednesday October 26, 2016 @01:52PM (#12798751)
https://www.crowdsupply.com/raptor-computing-systems/talos-s...

There are few "open" hardware/firmware efforts going on now.