Re:“Curl Bash piping” wall of shame
by contingencies on Friday October 21, 2016 @09:39PM
(#12766519)
There are better strategies than blindly relying on third party reputation. A primary approach is package management with hash databases, to ensure you are receiving the same code as others. Another is the use of multiple implementations whose results are compared, recently discussed @ https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=12666923
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You're still relying on the source to not be underhanded and malicious. Getting the same, reproducible build as everyone else only means you've got a lot of company. It doesn't mean there isn't malicious code or intentional "bugs."
Re:“Curl Bash piping” wall of shame
by contingencies on Friday October 21, 2016 @10:36PM
(#12766771)
You are right, though with hashing you've got effective post-release protection against a compromised source injecting malicious data at the very least, which these days is probably more likely than an outright malicious source for most major packages. So it's not without value. The second approach, more of an architectural workaround than a true solution, can still be used to insulate from major issues.
You can do that with curl + bash too. RVM does this: https://rvm.io/rvm/security