Re:CA Comodo used broken OCR and issued certificates to the ...
by bandrami on Friday October 21, 2016 @02:33PM
(#12763244)
I think you're still misunderstanding MiTM attacks. There is no "third party". I'm not communicating with my intended recipient at all: I'm communicating with precisely one person, the phisher.
And this can only be "solved" with PKI if we have CA's who don't do the sort of thing outlined in this bug report. But we do.
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Re:CA Comodo used broken OCR and issued certificates to the ...
by function_seven on Friday October 21, 2016 @04:25PM
(#12764374)
The MitM is in the middle of something, no? You're "A", the site you intend to connect to is "Z", and the MitM is "M".
In this scenario, you're communicating with Z, while M listens in. Anything you send down the pipe can be transparently proxied by M and relayed to Z.
What mechanism can you use to verify the authenticity of the other end that can't be spoofed by M, now that they're inserted into the communication path?