Yep. WebRTC data on by default, no prompt or restrictions, is a mistake. I understand prompts aren't a solution to everything, but silent data channels don't have a good use case yet, so it's an unnecessary risk.
It also breaks user specified preferences and expected behaviour: if I specify that my browser should use a proxy, it should use it.
> WebRTC data on by default, no prompt or restrictions, is a mistake.
If webrtc just performed the expected behavior seems like it wouldn't be an issue.
Current implementations of WebRTC, by default, only perform STUN over the default route (to address this exact situation).
See https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-rtcweb-ip-handling-01 for more details.
This is very misleading. Anonymous VPN users (China, Australia, etc.) don't care about hiding their VPN IP. They care about hiding their real IP.
Unfortunately, the default setup for WebRTC in browsers is to try STUN over _all_ network interfaces, which for default VPN setups on Windows, OSX, and Linux means sending packets outside of the VPN (which leaks your real IP!).
Also unfortunately, triggering the STUN doesn't require user consent, so all it takes is to visit a webpage and you've leaked your real IP[1].
This can literally be deadly default behavior. WebRTC needs to either only perform STUN over the default route, or STUN needs to be behind user opt-in consent (just like getUserMedia).
https://webrtchacks.com/dear-ny-times/