Re:WoSign and StartCom: Mozilla’s proposed conclusion
by mcpherrinm on Monday September 26, 2016 @08:16PM
(#12586699)
I'm not sure about this specifics here, but this is a feature offered by some CAs:
They create a new intermediate, signed by their root, just for you. You then get to ask that CA to issue certs for you - and only you.
You don't have total control over the intermediate -- as you suggest, that would let you mitm everyone.
But by having an intermediate that you effectively control, you could have apps/devices/etc that trust only that intermediate (via pinning, HPKP, etc). That prevents a bunch of the possible downsides of using the public PKI (eg, a CA mis-issuing a cert for your domains), the downsides of pinning a leaf cert (because you can always issue another one off your intermediate if you change names, etc), and the downsides of a private PKI (because stuff that trusts the public PKI works too)
They create a new intermediate, signed by their root, just for you. You then get to ask that CA to issue certs for you - and only you.
You don't have total control over the intermediate -- as you suggest, that would let you mitm everyone.
But by having an intermediate that you effectively control, you could have apps/devices/etc that trust only that intermediate (via pinning, HPKP, etc). That prevents a bunch of the possible downsides of using the public PKI (eg, a CA mis-issuing a cert for your domains), the downsides of pinning a leaf cert (because you can always issue another one off your intermediate if you change names, etc), and the downsides of a private PKI (because stuff that trusts the public PKI works too)