The problem with #2 is that it creates artificial scarcity. In this case, there is plenty of justification as you don't want shady medicine on the market. The question is whether the FDA is being overcautious with generics and imports. As of now there's certainly plenty of people illegally importing prescription medicine from offshore pharmacies in an unregulated manner, because prescription prices are so inflated compared to most countries.
Lobbying does not produce some of the outright corruption that bribery does, but I've seen more than my fair share of lobbying encouraged laws in the US over the years where a subtext of the law was to eliminate competition. I'm not sure how much of current drug law is pharmaceutical industry influence (my gut feel is some but not all) but some of it definitely, for good reasons or not, blocks up the "invisible hand" of competitive forces.
At least the good thing about a system like the US (vs. the Russian example) is that there's some hope that public outrage over the most egregious examples (your Martin Shkrelis and whatnot) will cause some changes.
I also agree that the case of Mylan is not as dramatic as that of the Russian heart stent company.
It gives three examples:
1) Lobbying to not let Medicare negotiate with drug manufacturers. Which is a perfectly reasonable policy to avoid a creating a monosopny buyer of drugs.
2) Lobbying for the Generic Drug User Fee Act. That law imposed fees on the industry to beef up FDA resources for reviewing applications of generics. It also imposed testing requirements on foreign production facilities equal to the testing requirements imposed on domestic facilities. Again, seems reasonable, and the Act was supported by public interest organizations.
3) Lobbying for federal funding to be used to purchase EpiPens for schools. Somewhat shady, but how does that kill anybody?