Tor Browser Exposed: Anti-Privacy Implantation at Mass Scale

Re:Tor Browser Exposed: Anti-Privacy Implantation at Mass Scale by openasocket on Wednesday September 21, 2016 @05:51PM (#12552594)

> Tor is not, nor has it ever been, trustworthy. Hell, you can still try active deanonymization for youself: https://github.com/Miserlou/Detour

Is it even possible to protect against end-to-end time correlation attacks without massively increasing latency?

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Re:Tor Browser Exposed: Anti-Privacy Implantation at Mass Scale by Mizza on Wednesday September 21, 2016 @06:09PM (#12552719)

I'd call that an "open problem."

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Re:Tor Browser Exposed: Anti-Privacy Implantation at Mass Scale by openasocket on Wednesday September 21, 2016 @06:48PM (#12552958)

I'm fairly certain it isn't possible. If you can detect, with high confidence, that an entity received a message and that an entity sent a message, timing attacks can be done. The traditional means to prevent this involves sending dummy traffic, introducing unpredictable latency, or using some sort of broadcast to conceal the exact receiver. None of those things are practical for a low-latency proxy.

It's been a couple years since I studied this, so I might be wrong.

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