I'm complaining there is no STANDARD & SECURE way to establish secrets (unlike say AES or Rabbit). That's not quite the same thing. Nearly everything has been designed to fail from the very beginning. Or are you saying you still trust "the experts" after everything that's happened?
Curve 25519 does not meet the ECRYPT recommendations of a min keylength of 512bits for Ellyptic Curves https://www.keylength.com/en/3/ Curve 25519 at 128bit provides:Very short-term protection against small organizations Should not be used for confidentiality in new systems
->OpenSSL since version 1.1.0
Probably the very worst example of an implementation you could give. OpenSSL version 1.1.0... Really????
So if they're broken - we'll know that very, very fast.
Because Bitcoin IS cracking encryption - bitcoins are assigned by doing exactly that.
In Bitcoin, a private key is usually a 256-bit number (giving a key length of at least 512 bits)
On the other hand, I'm sure all the MTgox customers will be happy with your assertion that their $450 million of missing/stolen funds allegedly stolen straight out of the MtGox hot wallet over time, beginning in late 2011. are actually still safe. Not sure they'll agree however.
This was your original stanza that I objected to:
"The problems are all in establishing keys. For that there are currently only two choices in use. ecdh. which all the standard curves appear to be backdoored. and rsa, which the russians reckon they have broken."
You were insinuating that basically there's no safe way to establish secrets (using some form of ecdh). While there absolutely is. Here's the list of open source packages using (safe) Curve25519 :
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Curve25519
In 2014 OpenSSH[14] defaults to Curve25519-based ECDH.
Libraries[edit]
Libgcrypt[15]
libssh[14][16]
NaCl[17]
GnuTLS[18]
mbed TLS (formerly PolarSSL)[19]
wolfSSL[20]
Botan[21]
Libsodium[22]
OpenSSL since version 1.1.0[23]
What else do you want from a "standard"?