A disappointing end to the argument, IMO. Not just because of my personal dislike for Ayn Rand, but because it seems like it's just sort of stuck on the end there without appropriate justification. It would be better either without that part at all, or with a complete argument as to why Ayn Rand's position is not subject to the same criticism.
Religious morality is mystical? That's a reasonable point to argue. Dawkins' morality is equally mystical? The author presents a decent argument for this. Ayn Rand's morality is not mystical? Kind of a bold thing to merely assert and then duck out of the room.
"Those who maintain that being moral consists in being altruistic have no alternative but to base that belief on some form of mysticism"
It's like they haven't heard of the iterated prisoner's dilemma or something.
And even if such illustrations were more helpful, they wouldn't rise to the same level as an imperative moral code. Why not just view them as a challenge to be overcome?
Because I usually feel bad when I harm others, and I usually feel good when I help others. Altruism seems to be built into most human brains, and it would take a lot of conditioning to overcome. Most importantly, I think eliminating altruism would lead to a world where average quality of life was lower.
(Of course, these altruistic tendencies are what cause me to care about average quality of life.)
I do, to, but I also feel that often it's because it has been drilled into me.
If you prefer to look at it from a purely sociopathic amoral viewpoint, your ability to be a lone, rational actor is largely dependent on your interactions with society. You just have to look at people like Ted Kazcynski to see how completely independent actors live.
Game theory doesn't explain altruism. It wouldn't even convince people that capitalism (with full protection of individual rights) is a decent system to support. It's a game, and can be interpreted many ways, including self-interest.
Anyway, I think the author makes a bit of a straw man argument when saying that Dawkins' "moral Zeitgeist" doesn't determine a rational, consistent basis for morality. I don't believe that Dawkins was trying to show that.
I believe that Dawkins was trying to show that both religious and irreligious folks derive their morals from the same place for the most part: the moral Zeitgeist. This is a counter to the argument that religion is necessary for morality, because morality for most people is drawn from the Zeitgeist either way.
I haven't read Dawkins, so I may be wrong in my assertions of what Dawkins intended, but it feels like the author covertly (or accidentally) tried to shift the focus away from countering the "religion is necessary for morals" argument, onto a different topic (that of defining rational morals).