Overall if you go through their paper page 38 has a good overview of various hardware security platforms / frameworks and what attacks they can protect against and what they are still vulnerable too.
SGX seems to be vulnerable to 2 cache timing attacks and a page fault attack, it however does provide mitigation / protection against malicious hypervisor / OS attacks, as well as co residing malicious applications, and if you use SGX + TXT (& TPM) in theory you are only exposed to container level cache timing attacks which while might not be great is still something.
Don't let perfect be the enemy of good :)
Defending against a software side-channel adversary was never a design objective of SGX, and Intel acknowledges so on slide 115 of the tutorial linked below.
https://software.intel.com/sites/default/files/332680-002.pd...
> Shortly after we learned about Intel’s Software Guard Extensions (SGX) initiative, we set out to study it in the hope of finding a practical solution to its vulnerability to cache timing attacks. After reading the official SGX manuals, we were left with more questions than when we started. The SGX patents filled some of the gaps in the official documentation, but also revealed Intel’s enclave licensing scheme, which has troubling implications.
> After learning about the SGX implementation and inferring its design constraints, we discarded our draft proposals for defending enclave software against cache timing attacks. We concluded that it would be impossible to claim to provide this kind of guarantee given the design constraints and all the unknowns surrounding the SGX implementation. Instead, we applied the knowledge that we gained to design Sanctum [38], which is briefly described in § 4.9.
> This paper describes our findings while studying SGX. We hope that it will help fellow researchers understand the breadth of issues that need to be considered before accepting a trusted hardware design as secure. We also hope that our work will prompt the research community to expect more openness from the vendors who ask us to trust their hardware.
https://eprint.iacr.org/2016/086.pdf