If the Amazon SES can't figure this out, they have no business sending SMTP e-mail.
I do apply the SPF check and reject the SMTP if it comes up as a confirmed negative: the sending domain has an SPF record, with strict semantics, and the IP doesn't match.
SPF speaks to a different problem (not the problem of "is this host a spammy host?"), and generally has no teeth. Passing SPF only informs me that the IP address sending to me is allowed to use the given envelope sender domain. A spammer can register a bunch of domains and set up SPF records for them, and then use the domains as envelope addresses. (Of course, these envelope sender addresses don't necessarily have anything to do with what is in the From: header).
You can't expect some sort of free pass just because you made a SPF record. What the SPF record does is protect your domain from being used by other people the bases of a sender envelope address. This is of low value, because most recipients don't even see the envelope address.
SPF can be applied against From: too but that's fraught with problems, because of forwarding via mailing lists, or people using alternative sending identities which are legitimate.
Every mail sever defaults should be to trust an encrypted connection with a valid MX host name. Failing that, it may choose to check either reverse DNS or SPF. I see no reason for preferring any of those. Not checking anything by default isn't a good idea nowadays.
This condition ensures that a verified host name has been looked up from the IP address of the client host. (This may have happened already if the host name was needed for checking a host list, or if the host matched host_lookup.) Verification ensures that the host name obtained from a reverse DNS lookup, or one of its aliases, does, when it is itself looked up in the DNS, yield the original IP address.
The phrase "or one of its aliases" seems to imply that the match does not strictly require the A record.