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Re:The Cat-And-Mouse Story of Implementing Anti-Spam for Mai... by kazinator on Wednesday August 31, 2016 @11:18AM (#12398943)
One powerful rule that I use in my Exim setup is to drop any SMTP connection that doesn't have forward and backward DNS that match. This catches a big majority of all spam, with hardly any false positive downside. No credible in SMTP forwarding host has broken DNS (by definition, practically). Lots of spamming machines do. Of course, not all, but this is a game of percentages and multiple stages.
Re:The Cat-And-Mouse Story of Implementing Anti-Spam for Mai... by treve on Wednesday August 31, 2016 @11:45AM (#12399145)
You'll definitely lose email from Amazon SES then. What about checking SPF records instead?
Re:The Cat-And-Mouse Story of Implementing Anti-Spam for Mai... by kazinator on Wednesday August 31, 2016 @11:55AM (#12399230)
My darned residential cable line has forward and reverse DNS that match.

If the Amazon SES can't figure this out, they have no business sending SMTP e-mail.

I do apply the SPF check and reject the SMTP if it comes up as a confirmed negative: the sending domain has an SPF record, with strict semantics, and the IP doesn't match.

SPF speaks to a different problem (not the problem of "is this host a spammy host?"), and generally has no teeth. Passing SPF only informs me that the IP address sending to me is allowed to use the given envelope sender domain. A spammer can register a bunch of domains and set up SPF records for them, and then use the domains as envelope addresses. (Of course, these envelope sender addresses don't necessarily have anything to do with what is in the From: header).

You can't expect some sort of free pass just because you made a SPF record. What the SPF record does is protect your domain from being used by other people the bases of a sender envelope address. This is of low value, because most recipients don't even see the envelope address.

SPF can be applied against From: too but that's fraught with problems, because of forwarding via mailing lists, or people using alternative sending identities which are legitimate.

Re:The Cat-And-Mouse Story of Implementing Anti-Spam for Mai... by r00fus on Wednesday August 31, 2016 @06:51PM (#12402072)
Is this a bad thing, if you're trying to avoid spam?
Re:The Cat-And-Mouse Story of Implementing Anti-Spam for Mai... by marcosdumay on Wednesday August 31, 2016 @04:35PM (#12401261)
Never thought about it (and I've been thinking about email a lot recently), but now that people mentioned it...

Every mail sever defaults should be to trust an encrypted connection with a valid MX host name. Failing that, it may choose to check either reverse DNS or SPF. I see no reason for preferring any of those. Not checking anything by default isn't a good idea nowadays.

Re:The Cat-And-Mouse Story of Implementing Anti-Spam for Mai... by Nux on Wednesday August 31, 2016 @12:00PM (#12399274)
So, do you require the PTR and A records of the remote host to match?
Re:The Cat-And-Mouse Story of Implementing Anti-Spam for Mai... by kazinator on Wednesday August 31, 2016 @12:48PM (#12399659)
I don't work with DNS at the protocol level; it's done via the Exim "verify = reverse_host_lookup". The documentation says:

This condition ensures that a verified host name has been looked up from the IP address of the client host. (This may have happened already if the host name was needed for checking a host list, or if the host matched host_lookup.) Verification ensures that the host name obtained from a reverse DNS lookup, or one of its aliases, does, when it is itself looked up in the DNS, yield the original IP address.

The phrase "or one of its aliases" seems to imply that the match does not strictly require the A record.

Re:The Cat-And-Mouse Story of Implementing Anti-Spam for Mai... by jlgaddis on Wednesday August 31, 2016 @09:44PM (#12402683)
The general term for this is "Forward Confirmed reverse DNS" (FCrDNS). I do these checks (plus others) on my Postfix mail systems. I would assume most of the other (sane) MTAs can perform these checks as well.