There's an FAQ, linked at the top of that post, which probably addresses any of the other arguments you'd try to raise here.
DNSSEC is a failed project, and a dodged bullet.
The current CA system is already in place; an alternative should be better in the goals we wish to achieve, otherwise why incur in the switching costs?
Also, if DANE is deployed, we can ditch CAs for non-EV certificates.
https://www.imperialviolet.org/2015/01/17/notdane.html
Second: you already can limit which CAs can issue a certificate for your domain, without forklifting out the DNS:
https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/Security/Public...
Yes, there is HPKP, but it is "Trust on First Use" and adds entropy for browser fingerprinting.
Meanwhile: it's "trust on first use" for individual connections, but if you break a pin, your browser vendor will find out. It doesn't matter if a pin is broken for a minor reason or because some CA in Uzbekistan falsified the entire chain: either way, shenanigans get CAs penalized. It's happened repeatedly and will happen more and more.