Second, DNSSEC doesn't even prevent this attack! All it does is attempt to protect name lookups. SMTP itself doesn't magically become secure just because there was a signature on an A record.
Finally, we're already doing something that meaningfully blunts this attack. No matter how the CA system is compromised, browsers still monitor certificate pins. When pins break, the CA associated with the malicious certificate gets reported. When that happens, as we've seen repeatedly, the CA gets penalized --- or put out of business entirely.
Public key pinning, CT, and surveillance is actually making a dent in the Internet trust problem. DNSSEC is a charade --- or, I think, something worse than that: you can't simply "revoke" .COM.
1. take away all the existing CA=YES certificates
2. stop using SMTP for domain verification, and issue the certificate at the same place that a domain's NS records are set (i.e. in a domain registrar's control panel), preferably in way that clients won't accept certificates issued by unrelated (and there unauthorized) domain registrars.
As I mentioned the other day, nobody is talking about revoking ".com". We'd have multiple registrars under ".com", and if one behaves badly, revoke that particular registrar. Also, if ".com" itself is out to spoof you, then you have already lost as a .com domain owner, so maybe we SHOULD revoke all of .com if proof of that surfaces, so that everyone will know that .com can't be trusted at all anymore.
1. Make business arrangements with a handful of CAs to require additional verification when issuing certificates for your domain.
2. Use public key pinning to restrict your domain to those CAs.
3. Monitor certificate transparency logs to ensure that your chosen CAs are only issuing authorized certificates, and that other CAs are not issuing certificates for your domain. (CT does not have full coverage yet, but it has already done more to improve PKI security than DNSSEC has.)
If one of your chosen CAs violates your trust, you drop them like a hot potato. DNSSEC removes this agility, leaving you at the mercy of your registrar and every zone operator higher than you in the hierarchy.
(And yes, for the record, HPKP blunts the compromised-CA weapon somewhat, but adoption has been pretty crummy. IIRC the latest iOS Safari and IE don't support it at all.)
Moreover, the surveillance aspect of HPKP doesn't require IE and Safari adoption. Chrome and Firefox are way more than substantial enough to make the risk of detection not worth the reward of trying to deploy a forged certificate. Note how many times in the past few years Google has slapped down CAs for "accidentally" issuing Google certificates.
The fact that HPKP and CT have not been fully adopted yet is not a good argument against them when the alternative under discussion is DNSSEC+DANE, which has seen even less adoption and doesn't even solve the problem.