Re:The case for making New York and San Francisco much, much...
by smallnamespace on Thursday August 18, 2016 @12:05PM
(#12313604)
There's significant friction in trying to bribe people out directly (e.g. did you bribe the right people, and did you pay them the right amount?). Every single transaction needs to be separately negotiated, and the developer, unlike the state, doesn't have access to all the existing value of the people they're negotiating with.
The point of codifying this sort of payout is so that approval would happen automatically -- i.e. the law says the developer gets green lighted as long as they pay. Basically the 'negotiation' between developers and the community happens only once, during the legislative debate.
Re:The case for making New York and San Francisco much, much...
by jessaustin on Thursday August 18, 2016 @12:50PM
(#12314133)
It is a fact about legislatures that this sort of negotiation would take place again every year. Places with not enough housing would want lower rates, big developers would want the scheme to be restructured so that only their accountants and lawyers could figure it out, schools (and eventually numerous other public services) would want a piece of the action, etc. And NIMBYs would still protest new development.
I upvoted you because you do identify a real challenge with bribery; but this solution won't solve that problem.
Re:The case for making New York and San Francisco much, much...
by smallnamespace on Thursday August 18, 2016 @01:23PM
(#12314491)
I agree - certainly not convinced that this particular idea is a workable solution, but any eventual fix will definitely look like bribery just because of the political dynamics here.
Surely if this would work, developers would already be bribing NIMBYs directly? If they can't profit after the bribe, then they can't profit after the tax either.